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The Prospects for Enforcing Monetary
Judgments of the International Court of
Justice: A Study of Nicaragua's
Judgment Against the United
States
MARY ELLEN O'CONNELL*
In March 1988, Nicaragua's Sandinista government asked the
International Court of Justice ("ICJ") to order the United States to
pay $12 billion for violations of international law, as determined by
the Court in June 1986.1 Before the Court could rule, however, the
Sandinistas were voted out of office in national elections on February
25, 1990.2 Nicaragua's new government has recently indicated that it
does not intend to give up the claim but will seek a settlement of the
* Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law. My thanks to colleagues
in international law, Oscar Schachter, Tony D'Amato, Jost Delbruck, Sean Murphy, and
Christoph Seibt, and to colleagues at Indiana, Craig Bradley, Dan Conkle, Alex Tanford,
Lynne Henderson, Harry Pratter and Rebecca Rudnick who commented on earlier drafts of
the paper.
1. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.CJ. 14 (Judgment of June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua]. In June 1986, the International
Court of Justice found that the United States had violated general international law in aiding
the Contra forces, in overflying Nicaraguan territory, and in laying mines in Nicaraguan
waters. The United States also violated a treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation by
imposing a trade embargo and by using armed force. The Court ordered the United States to
cease these activities and to discuss payment of reparations with Nicaragua. It left the form
and amount of reparations to the parties but, failing agreement, the Court reserved "the
subsequent procedure in the case." Nicaragua, supra, 1986 I.C.J. at 149. No discussions on
reparations have occurred since the Court's judgment, the United States taking the position
that the Court had no jurisdiction and could not issue an order against it. Nicaragua
submitted briefs on damages to the Court in March 1989, requesting S12 billion. Telephone
interviews with David Wippman, attorney for Nicaragua (June 16, 1989 and Mar. 16, 1990).
2. See Chamorro and Sandinista Rulers Begin Delicate Transition Talks, N.Y. Times, Feb.
28, 1990, at Al, col. 4.
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judgment with the United States government. 3 But if the parties can-
not reach a voluntary settlement, can Nicaragua enforce an ICJ judg-
ment against the United States - or any other state, for that matter?
The efficacy of ICJ judgments is surely important to states which
may be contemplating whether to seek monetary damages in current
or future cases.4 States considering such cases must determine
whether it is worth expending the significant resources necessary to
bring an action before the ICJ if the resulting judgments cannot be
enforced.5
The enforcement problem obviously does not arise where the judg-
ment debtor is willing to pay the award. Israel, for example, paid
reparations following the ICJ's advisory opinion in the Reparation
Case.6 In Corfu Channel, however, in which the ICJ ordered Albania
to pay damages to the U.K. in 1954, Albania has refused to pay to
this date.7 If Corfu Channel, even after thirty-five years, remains
indicative of the status quo regarding ICJ judgments, it may stand for
the proposition that, in the face of a recalcitrant judgment debtor,
money judgments are effectively unenforceable.'
3. Nicaragua Seeks US Deal Over $12bn Damages Claim, Fin. Times, Aug. 14, 1990, at 5,
col. 7. The United States continues to oppose the claim. See U.S. Urges Nicaragua To Forgive
Legal Claim, N.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 1990, at 15, col. 5.
4. The ICJ presently has several cases pending before it in which monetary damages are
contemplated. In addition to Nicaragua's case, the Iranians have brought a case against the
United States for the shooting down of an Iranian Airbus. See Case Concerning the Aerial
Incident of 3 July 1988 (Iran v. U.S.), 1989 I.C.J. 1 (Order of July 13); 1988-1989 I.C.J.Y.B.
143-44 (1989). Nauru has asserted a claim against Australia concerning the exploitation of its
mineral resources. See Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Austl.), 1989 I.C.J. 12
(Order of July 18); 1988-1989 I.C.J.Y.B. 144-45 (1989).
5. The ICJ could, of course, make a declaratory judgment on the law. See infra text
accompanying notes 56-61 (discussing the advantages and disadvantages of awarding
declaratory judgments). This Article concerns only enforcement of monetary damage awards.
The ICJ has made far fewer monetary awards than other types of decisions, but money
judgments are generally considered easier and less controversial to enforce than other types of
awards. See, e.g., Uniform Foreign Money-Judgements Recognition Act, 13 U.L.A. 261
(1986). So to the extent that it is difficult for states to get enforcement of these awards, such
difficulty makes an even stronger impression that the system of international adjudication is
inadequate. Nevertheless, much of the discussion herein would also apply to other types of
determinations. For an analysis of the types of awards made by international courts, see C.
Gray, Judicial Remedies in International Law (1987).
6. Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949 I.C.J. 174
(Advisory Opinion of April 11).
7. Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Judgment of April 9). Ironically,
Albania consented to go to the Court, while Israel's consent would not have been at issue in
the U.N.'s decision to request an advisory opinion from the Court. Thus, while consent to go
to the ICJ may indicate that a state is more willing to pay a judgment, even with consent,
enforcement may sometimes be needed.
8. Judge Abraham Sofaer, the former Legal Adviser to the Department of State, would
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This Article presents an inquiry into the prospects for enforcement
of monetary judgments of the IC. The introduction attempts to
establish the importance to the international community of having
enforceable IC judgments. The three sections which follow consider
the relative merits of different institutional mechanisms available for
enforcing decisions: enforcement through international organiza-
tions, specifically the IC, the U.N. Security Council, and the U.N.
General Assembly; enforcement between the parties, either by seeking
recognition of the judgment in the courts of the judgment creditor or
debtor, or through self-help; and enforcement through third-party
assistance.
The Article concludes that prospects for enforcement have in fact
improved - not primarily because of developments with regard to
the ICJ itself, but more because enforcement of analogous interna-
tional awards has improved markedly. Various courts and other insti-
tutions, recognizing the importance of enforcement, now regularly
recognize international awards, thus making it more likely that ICJ
judgments will have real effect.
I. INTRODUCTION: WHY WORRY ABOUT ENFORCEMENT?
Despite the fact that in practice many states have resisted recogniz-
ing adverse ICJ judgments, eg., the United States' position on the
appear to agree with this conclusion. In reference to Nicaragua, he asserted that any attempt
by Nicaragua to enforce a judgment will be "pointless and counterproductive .. .[we] will be
forthright about our unwillingness to participate and to tolerate any effort to obtain a
judgment." ICJ Merits Watching, State Department's Top Legal Advisor Tells Bar, D.C. Bar
Rep., Aug./Sept. 1989, at 8.
Indeed, by all accounts the U.S. appears unlikely to conform with the judgment. In 1984,
when the U.S. learned Nicaragua would submit a case to the Court regarding its activities in
and against Nicaragua, the U.S. attempted inter alia to change its acceptance of the ICJ's
jurisdiction to exclude cases concerning Central America. 84 Dep't. St. Bul., No. 2087, June
1984, at 89. The ICJ, nevertheless, found it had jurisdiction, at which point the United States
announced it would no longer participate in the proceedings. 85 Dep't. St. Bul., No. 2096,
Mar. 1985, at 64.
Before finding jurisdiction, the ICJ ordered provisional measures pending the outcome of
the case: "The United States of America should immediately cease and refrain from any
action restricting, blocking or endangering access to or from Nicaraguan ports, and, in
particular, the laying of mines .... The right to sovereignty and to political independence
possessed by the Republic of Nicaragua, like any other State of the region or of the world,
should be fully respected and should not in any way be jeopardized by any military and
paramilitary activities which are prohibited by the principles of international law." Nicaragua,
1984 I.CJ. 168, 187 (Provisional Measures Order of May 10). The United States ceased
mining Nicaraguan harbors near the time that the Court ordered interim measures. N.Y.
Times, May 11, 1984, at A8, col. 1 (statement of Mr. Hughes, U.S. Dept. of State). The
commitment to the Contras and the economic embargo ended only with the Sandinistas'
election defeat.
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Nicaragua judgment, international law generally requires compliance
with the judgments of the ICJ.9 This mandate suggests, as a corol-
lary, that ICJ judgments should be universally recognized and
enforced - in the same manner as domestic judgments at the intra-
state level. Yet some international lawyers and commentators, in par-
ticular former Judge of the ICJ Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, have voiced
reservations to the idea.1
The argument against enforcement is rooted in the assumption that
international society has not developed to the point where automatic
enforcement of international decisions can be contemplated. There
are three bases upon which the argument against enforcement rests:
(i) that states will never be cooperative in enforcing judgments
because governments are simply unwilling to relinquish control over
their affairs, (ii) that efficient enforcement is inconsistent with the for-
mation of customary international law, and (iii) that the impersonal,
institutionalized enforcement available on the domestic plane is sim-
ply unavailable internationally."1
The first argument against enforcement, as explained by Fitzmau-
rice, posits the existence of a general unwillingness on the part of
states to accept greater enforcement of ICJ judgments due to a disin-
clination to submit to the authority of extranational bodies. Making
judgments more easily enforceable would increase such "outside"
pressures and have an overall negative effect upon the international
system:
By [a]... psychological process, the existence of any really
certain and efficient means of law enforcement, in particular
as regards judicial decisions, could well be detrimental to
the wider acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction by acting as
an inhibiting factor, and increasing defacto the commitment
that governments would be called upon to make by
litigating. 12
9. See, e.g., Judgment of the International Court of Justice of 27 June 1986 Concerning
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua: Need for Immediate
Compliance, G.A. Res. 11, 43 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 18-19, U.N. Doc. A/43/49
(1988): "aware that, under the Charter of the United Nations, the International Court of
Justice is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations and that each member undertakes
to comply with the decision of the Court in any case to which it is a party."
10. See generally Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice, 178 Recueil des
Cours 216 (1982).
11. See G. Fitzmaurice, The Future of Public International Law in Livre du Centenaire,
Annaire de l'Institut de Droit International (1973).
12. Id. at 299.
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Those who argue against enforcement, however, provide little
empirical evidence of this psychological process. One might equally
make the opposite argument: states are unwilling to adjudicate their
disputes primarily because the results are too uncertain. Governments
thus may not wish to commit time, expense and national prestige to a
vain pursuit,'3 unless the likelihood of effective enforcement is ren-
dered more certain. 14
In any event, even if Fitzmaurice's surmise is correct, it merely
stresses a potential "negative" result of enforcement - an increased
column of adjudication - over another, more preferable likely effect
- an increased certainty of result. A unique benefit of adjudication is
supposed to be an assured result, namely an end to a dispute.' 5 Con-
sistent enforcement promotes that result; lax enforcement does not.
States that merely want to air their views or get an opinion on a ques-
tion of law, without bearing the burden of an adverse decision, have
other alternatives. 16 States that want a binding decision have only one
option: adjudication, and without enforcement this becomes a hollow
option.
The second argument against efficient enforcement is that it would
interfere with the formation of customary international law:
13. Without better enforcement, Jenks believes international adjudication will not grow:
It may, therefore, be imprudent to envisage a substantial extension of compulsory
adjudication, the introduction of a wider range of procedures and remedies, the
reference to adjudication of more important and more controversial questions, and
the assumption by international courts and tribunals of a more vigorous role in the
creative development of the law, without simultaneously reviewing the problem of
securing compliance with international decisions and awards.
C. Jenks, The Prospects of International Adjudication 666 (1964).
14. In fact, the experience of the European Community bears out this hypothesis - the
more efficacious the European Court of Justice has become, the more frequently European
states have resorted to it and respected its decisions. See Stuart, The Court of Justice of the
European Communities: The Scope of Its Jurisdiction and the Evolution of Its Case Law
Under the EEC Treaty, 3 Nw. J. Int'l L & Bus. 415 (1981); see generally infra notes 135-47
and accompanying text (increasing use of commercial arbitration as a result of enforceable
outcomes).
15. R. Bilder, International Dispute Settlement and the Role of Adjudication 59 (May
1986) (Disputes Processing Research Program, Working Paper Series 7).
16. States can go to the United Nations and request a debate or resolution; they can ask the
United Nations to request the ICY to give an advisory opinion, see, eg., Western Sahara Case,
1975 LCJ. 12, 13 (Advisory Opinion of Oct. 16) (issued as a result of Spain's initiative); Legal
Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West
Africa), Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1971 I.C.J. 16, 17
(Advisory Opinion of June 21) [hereinafter Namibia]; or they can convene a panel of jurists to
pronounce on the law. Such a panel recently deliberated on the question of whether Kurt
Waldheim had committed war crimes during World War H. It concluded that while he lied
about his service, he did nothing on the level of the crimes typically tried at Nuremberg. The
decision, of course, has no binding effect.
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[It] may well be that the very unenforceability in general of
international law as a whole - at least in the last resort and
except by the use of armed force - has been favorable to its
development in the service of the world community; for the
truth must be faced that in the absence of any true interna-
tional legislature, it is not infrequently only by breaking the
law that the law can be changed, or rather that those
processes can be set in motion which will ultimately lead to
the emergence of a new and more generally acceptable
rule. 17
This leg of the argument seems particularly deficient. Customary
international law is usually made through a subtle, step-by-step pro-
cess, during which states may occasionally violate an old rule of cus-
tom to develop a new one. Yet it seems difficult to argue convincingly
that states are developing customary international law when they
refuse to comply with an ICJ judgment.18 Except perhaps for Fisher-
ies Jurisdiction, there seem to be few examples where a state did defy
the ICJ as part of its quest to change a rule of customary international
law.' 9 Even if states create customary law by breaking it, moreover, it
seems preferable to encourage states to change international law by
operating within the system, such as by treaty, rather than without.
One way to do so is by imposing costs on law-breakers, such as
enforcing ICJ judgments against them.
The final argument against better enforcement of ICJ judgments
maintains that enforcement must be viewed differently in the interna-
tional system because it is not sufficiently institutionalized. Thus,
unlike the impersonal enforcement of the domestic system, enforce-
ment on the international plane is most effective via self-help:
Enforcement must consist, directly or indirectly, of
processes of self-help, and even if these take forms that are
recognized as normal and legitimate, they will always tend
17. G. Fitzmaurice, supra note 11, at 299. Schachter writes that "this argument comes
close to justifying law-breaking as a necessary evil in the process of the development of
customary international law." Schachter, supra note 10, at 218.
18. In Corfu Channel, for example, it is unlikely that Albania was trying to change the law
when it fired on British vessels in the Corfu Channel, then refused to go to the ICJ to argue its
case or to pay the judgment. And in those instances where the process of changing the law is
rapid, such as in the adoption of principles regarding outer space, there is little if any time to
discuss violating the law before the law has been transformed.
19. See Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (U.K. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. 3 (Judgment of July 25);
(F.R.G. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. 175 (Judgment of July 25). In the end, however, Iceland and the
U.K. resolved the dispute by negotiation. Iceland did not rely on its defiance of the ICJ to get
the legal changes it wanted.
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to encounter hostility and resistance, since the same consid-
erations that were felt by the peccant or defaulting State as
justifying the original breach will also be felt as justifying
the original will also be felt as justifying resistance to
attempts at enforcement. 20
This argument, however, seems confused as to whether it is against
enforcement per se or in favor of more institutionalized enforcement.
In fact, as Fitzmaurice's quote seems to admit, such unilateral self-
help might tend to exacerbate the original conflict, rather than cure
it,21 while, in the context of judicial enforcement, the risk of exacer-
bating the situation is less.' Failure to obey a decision of the Interna-
tional Court is an unequivocal violation of international law and
presumably the counter-measures taken after such a violation would
be limited to the parameters of the ICY judgment, but judicial enforce-
ment offers satisfactory safeguards, whether in the courts of third par-
ties or those of the parties themselves.3 The objectivity of a third
party and the availability of a fair procedure for enforcement are ulti-
mately preferable to self-help.
The arguments against improving enforcement are thus less persua-
sive than they might initially appear. Enforcement of judgments is an
essential aspect of any system of law, even international law, since
such systems provide regulated avenues of dispute resolution. The
cultivation of a strong legal enforcement mechanism may result in
greater respect for adjudication; without effective enforcement, states
have reason to view the recourse to tribunals as pointless and thereby
limit a means for the rule of law to have an impact on interstate rela-
tions.24 As one commentator writes,
20. G. Fitzmaurice, supra note 11, at 300.
21. See, eg., Case Concerning the Air Service Agreement Between the United States of
America and France:
It goes without saying that recourse to counter measures involves the great risk of
giving rise, in turn, to a further reaction, thereby causing an escalation which will
lead to a worsening of the conflict. Counter-measures therefore should be a wager on
the wisdom, not on the weakness of the other Party. They should be used with a
spirit of great moderation and be accompanied by a genuine effort at resolving the
dispute. But the Arbitral Tribunal does not believe that it is possible, in the present
state of international relations, to lay down a rule prohibiting the use of counter-
measures... or during negotiations, especially where such counter-measures are
accompanied by an offer for a procedure affording the possibility of accelerating the
solution of the dispute.
18 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 417, para. 91 (1978).
22. See Akehurst, Reprisals by Third States, 44 Brit. Y.B. Int'l. L 1, 13-14 (1970).
23. See infra sees. III & IV.
24. "The obligatory aspect of enforcement should be emphasized, for the ultimate
1990]
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[the] very fact that recourse to arbitration and judicial settle-
ment is infrequent and uncertain increases the prejudicial
effect that a single case of non-compliance will have on
future submissions of disputes. If enforcement measures are
not available or if they are inadequate, the sense of frustra-
tion is compounded, not only to the detriment of the rule of
law but also quite possibly to an extent that may involve a
direct threat to international peace.25
Simply put, enforcing international decisions is important. The
better the enforcement, the more efficacious the system, and, perhaps,
the greater the extent the system will be used in settling disputes
peacefully. That possibility warrants an analysis of the prospects for
increased enforcement of ICJ judgments.
II. ENFORCEMENT THROUGH INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
When a judgment creditor ascertains that the debtor is unwilling to
satisfy the ICJ's award, the first likely approach to getting the judg-
ment satisfied would be to return to the IC itself for help. The Court
has the authority and some means available to assist judgment credi-
tors but has often proved unwilling or unable to aid enforcement. A
second international organ through which enforcement might be
obtained is the U.N. Security Council. The Security Council has spe-
cific authority in the U.N. Charter to aid enforcement of ICJ judg-
ments, and may request the assistance of U.N. members, or such
powerful agencies as the International Monetary Fund ("IMF") and
the World Bank, in aiding enforcement. In many cases, however, the
Security Council is unlikely to get the opportunity to assist, due to the
possibility of a veto by one of the participating states. The creditor
may then have more success seeking enforcement through a third
international body, the U.N. General Assembly; it possesses the
authority to lend assistance to states with unenforced judgments,
though, to date, it has done little to help.
effectiveness of international decision making depends on viewing enforcement as a duty and
not merely as an inexpedient 'privilege'." W.M. Reisman, Nullity and Revision: The Review
and Enforcement of International Judgments and Awards 782 (1971).
25. Schachter, The Enforcement of International Judicial and Arbitral Decisions, 54 Am. J.
Int'l L. 1, 5-6 (1960). In October 1988, a decision of a United States Court of Appeals
provided some tangible evidence of the concerns expressed by Professors Schachter and
Reisman. Judge Mikva noted that, in part because decisions of the ICJ have not been obeyed,
he need not enforce ICJ decisions in any respect. See Committee of United States Citizens
Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 942 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
[Vol. 30:891
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A. The ICJ
The ICJ can point to a good record of compliance with final judg-
ments. This effectiveness in enforcing judgments seems widely recog-
nized, as prospects for the ICJ appear better than in forty years.
States are bringing increasing numbers of cases to the Court - in
1984 and 1989, the IC had record numbers of cases on its docket.26
The U.S. and U.S.S.R. have been discussing a mutual commitment to
use the Court to settle certain types of disputes.27
The primary rules governing the ICJ's decisions are found in the
Statute of the Court28 and the United Nations Charter.29 The Statute
provides that parties are bound to comply with the decisions of the
ICJ.30 It says nothing, however, about the proper steps to take when
a state fails to comply.31 Indeed the only hint that a state might not
comply appears in article 61(3): "The Court may require previous
compliance with the terms of the judgment before it admits proceed-
ings in revision. "32
The jurisprudence of the IC and its predecessor, the Permanent
Court of International Justice ("PCIJ"), has added little or nothing to
this brief reference because the need to do so simply has yet to arise.
26. In September 1984, the International Court of Justice had seven cases pending before it.
See 1983-1984 I.C.J.Y.B. 125, 133. In 1989, the Court had eight cases on its docket, the most
since the 1950's. See 1988-1989 I.C.J.Y.B. 132-58 (1989); see also Detente Breathes New Life
into World Court, Fin. Times, Oct. 4, 1989, at 6-8.
27. The Soviet Union and the United States are currently drafting a new type of adherence
to the jurisdiction of the ICJ. The two states will agree on a list of subjects which they
consider appropriate for the Court's consideration on a compulsory basis. With this more
specific designation of subjects, the consent to the Court would probably be narrower than that
of many commercial contracts. See 83 Am. Soc. Int'l L Proc. - (1989) (forthcoming)
(comments of Judge Sofaer, Legal Adviser, U.S Dept. of State). See also Judge Abraham
Sofaer, Coudert Lecture, Association of the Bar of the City of New York (December 1988).
28. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993
[hereinafter ICJ Statute].
29. Charter of the United Nations, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993 [hereinafter
U.N. Charter].
30. ICJ Statute, supra note 28, arts. 59 & 60. Rosenne points out that these articles restate a
general principle of international law that "when States agree to submit their dispute to an
international tribunal, they assume the obligation to comply with the decision of that
tribunal." S. Rosenne, The Law and Practice of the International Court 127 (1985). The
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice is set out in its Statute. ICJ Statute, supra
note 28, ch. II. States may bring cases by special agreement, under a compromisory clause in a
treaty or when both states have accepted the Court's compulsory jurisdiction. The latter two
types of jurisdiction are referred to here as "compulsory."
31. See C. Jenks, supra note 13, at 703; S. Rosenne, supra note 30, at 125-29.
32. ICY Statute, supra note 28, art. 61(3).
33. Professor Reisman found in 1971 that "in numerous statements, the Permanent Court
and the International Court of Justice have refused to consider even the possibility of
noncompliance." W.M. Reisman, supra note 24, at 641.
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Since 1970, the Court has not actually had to consider noncompliance
with a final judgment. 34 Moreover, in only one ICJ decision - Corfu
Channel - has a state repudiated an ICJ judgment which to date
remains only partially enforced.35 In a handful of other cases, states
began by repudiating the ICJ's judgment but events obviated the need
for enforcement in each case. In Fisheries Jurisdiction,36 for example,
Iceland refused to participate in the proceeding before the ICJ. A
year after the ICJ's judgment, Iceland and the United Kingdom nego-
tiated a final settlement of the dispute. 37 The ICJ has faced refusals to
comply with provisional measures; although such measures may not
have the same status as final decisions, in such cases38 the Court has
taken no action in response, even of a procedural nature.3 9 In spite of
the seemingly high rate of success of ICJ judgments, however, com-
mentators continue to disparage the ICJ's capacity to function as and
34. See infra text accompanying notes 44-46.
35. Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Judgment of April 9). Albania still
refuses to pay the damages awarded, although the channel is open and that, of course, was the
basic issue in dispute.
36. Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (U.K. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. 3 (Judgment of July 25); (F.R.G.
v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. 175 (Judgment of July 25).
37. See J. Charney, Disputes Implicating the Institutional Credibility of the Court:
Problems of Non-Appearance, Non-Participation, and Non-Performance in The International
Court of Justice at a Crossroads 295 (L. Damrosch ed. 1987). There are other examples in
which the need for enforcement was avoided. In the Asylum Case (Col. v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J.
266 (Judgment of Nov. 20), Colombia at first refused to obey the judgment, but in a subsequent
opinion, the Haya de ]a Torre Case (Col. v. Peru), 1951 I.C.J. 71 (Judgment of June 13), the
ICJ reversed its decision in Asylum. J. Charney, supra, at 294. Also, in United States
Diplomatic and Counselor Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3 (Judgment of May 24),
Iran did not participate and did not immediately conform to the ICJ's judgment, but it did
enter into negotiations which eventually resulted in the hostages' freedom and established the
Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal. See Algiers Accords, 81 Dep't. St. Bul. 1 (1981), reprinted in 20
I.L.M. 223-34 (1981). The United States relinquished its claim to damages arising from the
ICJ's decision. J. Charney, supra, at 288.
The Right of Passage Case (Port. v. India), 1960 I.C.J. 6 (Judgment of April 12), is more
difficult than the others to categorize. The ICJ ruled that Portugal had a right of passage from
its colonial territories on the Indian subcontinent across Indian territory to the coast. A year
after the decision, however, India seized the territories. J. Charney, supra, at 294-95. In one
sense, India violated the decision, but in another sense, the decision was rendered moot.
Portugal has not indicated that it still hopes to see the decision enforced.
38. France, Iceland, Iran and the United States have all failed to obey provisional orders of
the Court. See Nicaragua, 1984 I.C.J. 168 (Order of May 10); United States Diplomatic and
Counselor Staff in Tehran Case (U.S. v. Iran), 1979 I.C.J. 7 (Order of Dec. 15); Nuclear Tests
Cases (Austl. v. Fr.), 1973 I.C.J. 99 (Order of June 22); (N.Z. v. Fr.) 1973 I.C.J. 135 (Order of
June 22); Fisheries Jurisdiction Cases (U.K. v. Ice.), 1973 I.C.J. 302 (Order of July 12);
(F.R.G. v. Ice.), 1973 I.C.J. 313 (Order of July 12); see also J. Sztucki, Interim Measures in the
Hague Court (1983).
39. The Court could, for example, refuse to consider informal communications from states
which fail to obey orders. See Sinclair, Some Procedural Aspects of International Litigation,
30 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 338, 356-57 (1981); see also S. Rosenne, supra note 30, at 125-26.
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enjoy the authority of a "real" court.' They point out that several
states in the last fifteen years have chosen not to appear before the
Court and states consistently ignore orders on interim measures.4"
The state representatives who drafted the Statute of the Court
would not be surprised by the ICJ's inaction in the area of enforce-
ment, which they envisioned to be a non-judicial function best left to
the Security Council.42 When devising this plan they could not know
how ineffectual the Security Council would become, nor did they even
consider enforcement a potential problem at all. The ICJ's predeces-
sor, the Permanent Court of International Justice, had a good record
of compliance with its judgments,43 and the drafters might have
expected the ICJ to enjoy the same fortune based on reputation
alone.44
Despite such broad respect for the ICJ in the international commu-
nity, however, the historically high rate of judgment enforcement may
be due less to compliance compelled by the prestige and stature of the
ICJ than to the decentralized enforcement procedures typical to the
enforcement of international law. As international law evolves, such
a decentralized system of enforcement may no longer be sufficient. 5
An extremely visible repudiation of a monetary judgment, the type
most easily enforced in domestic courts, could easily damage the pres-
tige of the Court, which could deal a setback to the use of interna-
tional fora for the resolution of disputes.
Given that increasing the Court's "prestige" may not be a sufficient
approach to increase compliance, the ICJ could consider other actions
to limit its scope in order that its judgments might have a higher
probability of being respected. While a case is pending, the ICJ has
various options for gaining enforcement of its decisions. After the
case is decided, however, its options drop off dramatically. Unlike a
domestic court, it has no mechanism for seizing the assets of a recalci-
40. See, e.g., J. Charney, supra note 37, at 291.
41. While not unanimous, most scholars agree that interim measures are binding on parties
in the manner of judgments. See, e.g., J. Elkind, Interim Protection (1981); J. Sztucki, supra
note 38. On the problem of non-appearance and non-performance, see generally J. Charney,
supra note 37; H.W.A. Thirway, Non-Appearance Before the International Court of Justice
(1985); Mendelson, Interim Measures of Protection in Cases of Contested Jurisdiction, 46 Brit.
Y.B. Int'l L. 259 (1972-3); Sinclair, supra note 39.
42. See U.N. Charter, supra note 29, art. 94; see also L Goodrich, E. Hambro & A. Simons,
Charter of the United Nations 555-58 (3d ed. 1969).
43. See J. Chamey, supra note 37, at 288; Schachter, supra note 25, at 1.
44. Other international tribunals did not, however, possess such a good record. W.M.
Reisman, supra note 24, at 148-49.
45. See supra note 13 (quoting Jenks' view that international adjudication will not continue
to evolve until enforcement is improved).
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trant state, nor does it have the authority to order states to turn over
assets to the judgment creditor, as its orders are binding only on the
parties before it.46 Two possibilities for increasing compliance with-
out developing mechanisms of enforcement that seem initially palat-
able are by avoiding jurisdiction entirely or by issuing declaratory
judgments.
1. Avoiding Jurisdiction
Where the ICJ is concerned that a judgment will not be obeyed, one
method of dealing with the matter is avoiding a decision entirely by
refusing to take jurisdiction. Reisman suggests that:
[the] continuing authority of a decision process could be
jeopardized by an impugned decision. As a result, a deci-
sion maker may validly examine the possible effects of non-
enforcement of a decision on the organized decision process
and on the community's public order, and he should treat
these matters as factors in his ultimate decision. 7
The dangers of such an avoidance strategy are significant, and simi-
lar to the criticisms of the Supreme Court's avoidance of certain vola-
tile issues.48  First, surely the international community would be
aware of avoidance, which could result in harming the prestige of the
ICJ rather than shoring it up. The international community knew,
for example, that the ICJ was avoiding a decision in South West
Africa,49 and probably no other case has so damaged its reputation.50
When the ICJ did rule against South Africa's continuing presence in
Namibia,51 most states hailed the advisory opinion, saying it vindi-
cated the law as a useful tool in the struggle to end apartheid. The
46. ICJ Statute, supra note 28, art. 59.
47. W.M. Reisman, supra note 24, at 149-50.
This approach is akin to the remedy Alexander Bickel prescribed for the Supreme Court.
Bickel feared that the Supreme Court would legitimate bad laws if it could find no principled
basis for overturning them, and argued that in those cases it would be better for the Court to
avoid deciding. See A. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch (1962).
48. See Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues" - A Comment on Principle
and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1964). Gunther criticized Bickel's
"passive virtues" remedy as vulnerable and dangerous, because the public would likely see the
Court's abstention from decision as a way of legitimating the lower court's ruling. Gunther
believed that the Court has an obligation to decide in some cases, although many times the
Court would rather avoid the merits of the case.
49. South West Africa Cases (Eth. v. S. Afr., Liberia v. S. Afr.)(Second Phase), 1966 I.C.J.
6 (Judgment of July 18).
50. See Reisman, Revision of the South West Africa Cases, 7 Va. J. Int'l L. 1 (1966).
51. Namibia, 1971 I.C.J. 16 (Advisory Opinion of June 21).
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fact that South Africa has only recently honored the opinion 52 does
not appear to have done as much damage to the ICs prestige as the
earlier decision to avoid jurisdiction.
A second problem with prescribing avoidance is the difficulty in
identifying principles for guiding the ICJ in choosing avoidance.5 3
Like the U.S. Supreme Court, the ICJ has some flexibility over its
jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the ICYs Statute and rules do speak to
jurisdiction,' and it is the principles contained in those documents,
rather than political assessment, on which the ICJ should base its
decisions.
The risks of following the avoidance path are greater for interna-
tional law than domestic law. International law is still in its incipi-
ency. Achieving enforcement is important to the further development
of international law, but if it is achieved at the expense of justice, the
system will suffer rather than benefit.55 International lawyers cite ICJ
decisions for every nuance they contain. If these decisions reflect
expedience, then expedience will become embedded in the rules. For
the development of international law, therefore, the ICI should accept
even those cases in which its decisions might be resisted.
2. Declaratory Judgments
Another means by which the ICJ could achieve better compliance
would be for it to take jurisdiction whenever appropriate, but only
make declaratory judgments as opposed to monetary awards.56 Corfu
Channel57 might be the paradigmatic example: Britain did not get its
money, but in fact did get a pronouncement on the law, from which
Britain and every other naval power has benefitted ever since.
A policy of avoiding executory awards or even just avoiding mone-
52. Namibia received its independence on March 20, 1990. N.Y. Times, Mar. 21, 1990, at
1, col. 3.
53. See Gunther, supra note 48, at 7.
54. ICY Statute, supra note 28, art. 36.
55. Jenks writes that, while the prospect of enforceability should be a consideration:
where the margin ofjudicial discretion is particularly wide and the law is generally
recognized to be in an early but crucial stage of development, the danger that an
excessive preoccupation with enforceability may inhibit unduly the substantive
development of the law is a matter for special concern. If the expediency of not
risking defiance weighs more heavily in the scales ofjustice than the evolving needs
of the community, international adjudication abdicates its essential function of
dispensing justice; it becomes no more than still another barometer of the balance of
power.
C. Jenks, supra note 13, at 667.
56. Id. at 668.
57. Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.CJ. 4 (Judgment of April 9).
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tary awards would not, however, improve the stature of ICJ judg-
ments in the eyes of the international community. In most cases the
distinction between declaratory judgments and monetary awards
would probably not make much difference. In Monetary Gold, for
example, the Western Allies asked the ICJ for a declaratory judgment
to determine whether Albania or Italy owned certain gold recovered
during the Second World War.55  The Court found that it could not
rule in the case, but if it had, and the Allies had not returned the gold
to the rightful owner, the world's perception of the ICJ's abilities
would have been the same - the public would hardly distinguish a
ruling that the law requires the gold to go to Albania from an order to
give the gold to Albania.
Moreover, if the ICJ were not to award monetary damages in cer-
tain cases, the international community might conclude that the ICJ
had simply not achieved justice. In Corfu Channel, ships were dam-
aged and men were killed. If the ICJ ruled only that Albania unlaw-
fully mined an international strait and fired upon ships most people
would still believe that reparations were appropriate. 9
Most important, a refusal to award monetary damages might also
render ICJ judgments less significant to international law. In Nicara-
gua, for example, the ICJ found that the United States violated the
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation by imposing an eco-
nomic embargo. 6 The mere declaration of that finding adds to the
corpus of international law on the binding nature of treaties and may
encourage better treaty observation in the future. But a ruling that
the United States owes monetary damages, followed shortly thereafter
58. Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 (Italy v. Fr., U.K., U.S.), 1954 I.C.J. 19
(Judgment of June 15).
59. The Nuclear Tests Cases are also examples of where many observers felt justice was not
done, though it might have been, if the parties had requested monetary damages. Nuclear
Tests Cases (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253 (Judgment of Dec. 20); (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J.
457 (Judgment of Dec. 20). In Nuclear Tests, Australia and New Zealand asked the ICJ to
order France to stop testing nuclear weapons near their countries. France stated publicly,
shortly before the judgments were delivered, that its program of testing was finished. The ICJ
decided that this meant the case was moot and that it need not render a decision. For
Australia and New Zealand the result was less than satisfactory, because they wanted a ruling
on France's obligation not to test weapons. If they had asked for monetary damages, instead
of just a declaration, the ICJ would have had to rule on the lawfulness of France's past
conduct. True, if Australia and New Zealand had won, they would have faced the problem of
enforcement, but they also would have had an authoritative pronouncement on the law for use
in their own cause as well as by and against other countries. See Lectures by Elihu
Lauterpacht, Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, University of Cambridge (1981) (Mr.
Lauterpacht advised the government of Australia during the case).
60. Nicaragua, 1984 I.C.J. at 168.
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by enforcement of the award against the recalcitrant judgment debtor,
would plainly make a greater impact.
The use of declaratory judgments would not necessarily eliminate
the enforcement problem. States can already ask the ICJ for declara-
tory rulings, but the fact that they rarely do but, rather, ask for mone-
tary damages, implementation of boundary lines, return of temples,
release of hostages and so on, shows their interest in getting positive
outcomes even where the law is eminently clear.61 The state practice
most relevant to the Court - the practice by those states which use
the Court - supports retention of executory judgments, including
monetary awards. The elimination of the Court's jurisdiction to issue
executory judgments might encourage some states to avoid the Court
entirely.
As the analysis of the preceding proposals indicates, either of these
two changes is more likely to erode the ICJ's ability to have its judg-
ments enforced than enhance it. Moreover, regardless of the positive
developments in the recognition of ICJ judgments, it is clear that the
Court cannot rely on its prestige as its predecessor did. Therefore, the
means for enforcement of ICJ judgments will have to be found outside
the ICJ itself, either in international organizations such as the Secur-
ity Council or other mechanisms.
B. The Security Council
The drafters of the U.N. Charter gave responsibility for enforce-
ment to the Security Council:
If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incum-
bent upon it under a judgment rendered by the Court, the
other party may have recourse to the Security Council,
which may, if it deems necessary, make recommendations or
decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the
judgment.62
Until recently, however, it seemed very unlikely that the Council
would fulfill this responsibility because of internal ideological divi-
sions reflected in liberal use of the veto. The newfound cooperation
between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. may mean, however, that the Security
Council will in the future become a more viable means of assistance.63
61. See C. Gray, supra note 5, at 77-103.
62. U.N. Charter, supra note 29, art. 94(2).
63. See supra note 27.
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait has spurred further cooperation between the U.S. and the
U.S.S.R. Following the invasion on August 2, 1990, the Security Council passed a resolution
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Enforcement through the Security Council is thus technically avail-
able at law, although in practice obtaining it depends heavily upon the
sense of responsibility of those who occupy its positions and the polit-
ical situation at the time assistance is sought.
The Council's enforcement role was patterned after that of the
League of Nations Council, which did play a useful role in enforce-
ment. In 1933, Greece received an award against Bulgaria from the
PCIJ in the Rhodopia Forest case.64 When Bulgaria appeared unwill-
ing to pay the judgment, Greece simply said it would go to the League
and ask for enforcement pursuant to article 13(4) of the Covenant
which required that the Council take steps to enforce any judicial
decision. As soon as the League put the matter on its agenda, Bulga-
ria gave assurances that it would comply with the decision.65
The mandatory nature of the enforcement clause turned out to be
somewhat onerous because in the next case to be brought to the
League, the Optant's Case, the Council proved reluctant to enforce
the decision for political reasons. 66 The Optant's Case raised ques-
tions regarding an institution's obligation to enforce its tribunal's
decisions that have never been adequately answered, and were cer-
tainly not discussed, when the Security Council took over the League
Council's responsibility.
The drafters of the U.N. Charter were at least aware of the ques-
tions related to institutional enforcement because they made some sig-
nificant changes in article 94 from the League's article 13(4).67 The
travaux relating to article 94, however, are scant, and we do not know
condemning the invasion and calling for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi
troops; later resolutions imposed trade sanctions, declared the annexation of Kuwait null and
void and challenged Iraq's seizure of foreign hostages and the closure of foreign embassies in
Kuwait. N.Y. Times, Aug. 30, 1990, at Al, col. 4. On August 25, the Council passed an
unprecedented resolution authorizing the use of naval force by member states against any
attempts to evade the sanctions. These actions demonstrate an unparalleled level of
cooperation among the members of the Security Council and provide a "textbook example of
what World War II allies had in mind" when they drafted the U.N. Charter. Wash. Post,
Aug. 27, 1990, at Al. While the impact of these actions remains to be seen, the Iraq situation
lends support to the argument that the Security Council can work as designed.
64. See 28 Am. J. Int'l L. 760 (1934).
65. W.M. Reisman, supra note 24, at 686.
66. In the Optant's Case, Hungary had a decision against Rumania. See F. Deak, The
Hungarian-Rumanian Land Dispute (1928). Rumania did not wish to comply because it
claimed the decision would disrupt its agricultural reform program. The Council was
sympathetic to the program and decided to consider the issue under article 11(2) rather than
article 13(4). A commission was established and the whole matter was investigated. The
commission, in effect, decided a different result would be preferable and nullified the tribunal's
award. W.M. Reisman, supra note 24, at 687-96.
67. S. Rosenne, supra note 30, at 79-81.
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whether the changes were based on a new view of institutional
enforcement or, indeed, whether they were based on much analysis at
all. Several delegates may have worried that the Security Council
would be overburdened by assuming a new competence not originally
considered a part of its role when article 94 was put forth.68
The language of article 94 seems to demonstrate that such concerns
did in fact exist. Unlike the League Council, which was required to
take steps to enforce a judgment, the Council is granted discretion to
enforce a judgment. The Security Council may only deal with matters
presented to it by parties rather than proprio motu as could the
League Council, and it may only be called on to enforce ICJ judg-
ments rather than awards and decisions of other international tribu-
nals.69 The language of article 94 gives no specific authority,
however, to reexamine ICJ judgments. °
68. L. Goodrich, E. Hambro & A. Simons, supra note 42, at 555-57.
69. See S. Rosenne, supra note 30, at 148-54; Schachter, supra note 25, at 17.
70. This view is reinforced by article 60 of the Court's Statute, which says that decisions of
the Court are final. ICJ Statute, supra note 28, art. 60, see also Schachter, supra note 10, at
224.
Some commentators nevertheless question whether decisions of the ICY should be treated as
final. One scholar in particular asserts that, to attain the goals of world order, decisions of
international courts, including the ICJ, should not be automatically enforced. Rather,
potential enforcers like the Security Council should be permitted a quasi-review power, to
consider the possible impact of enforcement and to amend a judgment if it will not enhance
world order. W.M. Reisman, supra note 24, at 241-42. Reisman writes that finality of
decisions is not a worthy goal in itself unless it enhances the goal of stability which is at the
heart of his phrase, the "minimum objective of public order." Reisman, The Enforcement of
International Judgments, 62 Am. Soc. Int'l L. Proc. 13, 15 (1968).
This review proposition raises a profound problem for all law enforcement: whether courts
should avoid enforcing decisions where they detect that enforcement may result in social
instability. The same rule that obtains in the U.S. domestic system is probably applicable to
the international community: law serves stability better if it is not ignored. The alternative,
non-recognition of judgments to preserve stability, seems laden with hidden dangers. In cases
like the Nicaragua/U.S. dispute, for example, the likelihood of instability should the Security
Council choose not to enforce the decision because it finds it to be flawed is uncertain.
A similar argument against Security Council recognition of "bad" judgments, Le.,
judgments not in conformity with customary international law, also raises the danger of
instability as a consequence. Letter from Professor D'Amato to the author (August 25, 1989).
D'Amato cites Nicaragua as an example of a judgment which he believes wrongly assesses
customary international law. See D'Amato, Trashing Customary International Law, 81 Am.
J. Int'l L. 101 (1987). It is hard to see, however, how such a concern may be resolved
practically, given the difficulty in identifying who is entitled to decide whether a decision is
"bad law," or why it is assumed the representatives at the Security Council are likely to reach
a better legal decision than the 15 judges of the ICJ, who are "elected regardless of their
nationality from among persons of high moral character, who possess the qualifications
required in their respective countries for appointment to the highest judicial offices, or are
jurisconsults of recognized competence in international law." ICJ Statute, supra note 28, art.
2. But see T. Franck, Judging the World Court 35-36 (1986). On balance, the ICJ judges seem
a more appropriate group for making legal decisions than the representatives to the Security
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The fact that judgments are final means the Council is restricted
from reviewing the merits of a decision. There are, however, ques-
tions concerning the circumstances under which the Council should
enforce judgments as a general rule. First, the United States has in
the past argued that the Security Council should only enforce judg-
ments relating to threats to the peace. 7' The Security Council cer-
tainly possesses special authority for defusing threats to the peace, but
the language of article 94 does not support any such subject matter
restriction. Moreover, such a restriction would make article 94
redundant since the Security Council may already consider any dis-
pute threatening the peace under chapters VI and VII, regardless of
the source of the dispute.72
Second, and more interesting, is whether the Security Council
members' rights to veto apply to requests for enforcement under arti-
cle 94. Some commentators have suggested that, because article 94 is
not located in the chapters on peace and security, the veto should not
apply. Forty years after the creation of the veto this is a difficult
interpretation to support. The United States and the Soviet Union
have insisted on the use of the veto in so many different contexts it is
difficult to conceive of one in which they would not use it. Article
27(3), for example, appears on its face to prohibit the use of the veto
in some cases, by requiring that a party to a dispute brought to the
Council under chapter VI must abstain from voting; abstention, how-
ever, has not been the norm.7 3 Security Council practice has appar-
Council. Perhaps the drafters of the Charter reached this conclusion when they stated in the
Statute of the Court that judgments are final.
71. See Charter of the United Nations, Hearing before the Senate Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 79th Cong., 1st. Sess. 287 (1945) (statement of Leo Pasvolsky, Special Ass't to the
Secretary of State for Int'l Organizations and Security Affairs).
72. Schachter, supra note 25, at 19-20.
73. Article 27(3) states, "[d]ecisions of the Security Council on all other [non-procedural]
matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of
the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3
of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting." U.N. Charter, supra note 29, art.
27(3). If Nicaragua, therefore, went to the Security Council to get the decision in its case
enforced, it would be in a position to insist that the United States not vote on the matter,
including not vetoing any request for assistance. Nicaragua, however, has appealed to the
Security Council on numerous occasions regarding its dispute with the United States, and even
though the dispute has invariably raised questions of peace and security, the United States has
vetoed Nicaragua's requests. See, e.g., 41 U.N. SCOR (2704th mtg.) at 54-55, U.N. Doc. S/
PV.2704 (1986); 41 U.N. SCOR (2718th mtg.) at 51, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2718 (1986). Nor has
the Soviet Union recused itself when states have complained about its behavior. In 1980, the
Soviet Union voted against a resolution which called for an emergency special session to
examine the question of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. See S.C. Res. 462, 35 U.S. SCOR
(2190th mtg.) at 2, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2190 (1980).
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ently modified the requirements of article 27(3), and today it appears
that no permanent member of the Council may be expected to recuse
itself.
74
Yet regardless of its authority, the Security Council has never
received a request to enforce a final ICJ judgment. In 1954 it did
receive a request from the United Kingdom for enforcement of ICJ
interim measures against Iran resulting from that country's nationali-
zation of oil concessions held by U.K. citizens."- The Council
reached no conclusion regarding its capacity to enforce interim meas-
ures, however, as the request became moot.76
If not for political difficulties inherent to the body, the Security
Council could be quite effective in enforcing judgments, given its abil-
ity to call on the member states and specialized U.N. agencies to aid
in assisting enforcement.77 For example, the Council could call on
member states to apply sanctions against a state refusing to comply
with a decision of the IC2.78
74. As with contracts, subsequent practice should be able to modify treaties. See
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 334 reporters' note 2
[hereinafter Restatement].
75. Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case (U.K. v. Iran), 1951 I.CJ. 4 (Interim Protection Order of
July 5). The request produced a considerable amount of disagreement. The Soviet Union and
Yugoslavia asserted that the dispute was a matter of Iran's domestic jurisdiction and could not
be placed on the agenda under article 94. They also argued that the Security Council could
not enforce an order before the ICI had determined whether it had jurisdiction. 6 U.N. SCOR
(559th Mtg.) at 3, U.N. Doc. S/2357 (1951). The British representative argued, on the other
hand, that the Security Council could decide its own jurisdiction under article 94 and that the
Council had jurisdiction regardless of the ICJ's jurisdiction because the matter involved peace
and security. Id. at 20. As to interim measures specifically, the British representative stated
that the Council had implied jurisdiction to enforce an interim measures order because in some
cases if the parties did not obey interim measures a final decision would be frustrated. The
Security Council's ability to enforce the final judgment could be dependent on compliance with
the earlier order.
76. The departure of all British employees from Iran removed the need for resolving the
issue. France finally proposed that the Council postpone further debate until the ICJ
determined whether it had jurisdiction. 6 U.N. SCOR (565th mtg.) at 2-3, U.N. Doc. S/2358/
Rev. 2 (1951). The Security Council approved this proposal, perhaps giving the impression
that it had decided it could not act until the ICJ had ascertained jurisdiction.
77. The Council has taken action in other situations which could be very effective in the
enforcement context. For example, when Rhodesia's white-controlled government made a
unilateral declaration of independence from the United Kingdom in defiance of norms of
majority rule, the Security Council called on all member states to observe an economic boycott
of Rhodesia. See S.C. Res. 253, 23 U.N. SCOR Resolutions & Decisions at 5, U.N. D=c. S/
INF/23/Rev. 1 (1970); see also supra note 63 (Security Council actions regarding the Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait).
78. Cf. the Council's declaration that the continued presence of South Africa in Narmbia
violated international law and the Council's call for all member states to act in accordance
with that fact. S.C. Res. 276, 25 U.N. SCOR Supp. (July-Sept. 1970) at 81-83, U.N. Doc. S/
9863/Add.l/Rev.1 (1970).
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It is less certain, however, whether the Council possesses the
authority to instruct a member state to seize the assets of a judgment
debtor within the member's jurisdiction and turn them over to the
creditor in order to satisfy a judgment. The Council's power to call
on member states outlined in chapter VII of the Charter is certainly
very broad, suggesting that, where a failure to secure compliance with
a judgment threatened peace or security, it would indeed possess such
authority;79 but where peace is not threatened, such authority may
not obtain.80
Another significant variable related to Security Council enforce-
ment of judgments involves the Council's ability to manipulate or
direct the specialized agencies of the U.N. in enforcing a judgment.
Most of the specialized agency agreements pledge the agencies to
assist the Security Council in maintaining international peace and
security, which would imply enforcing ICJ judgments,8" and the agen-
79. Art. 41: The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of
armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the
Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These include complete or
partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic,
radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.
Art. 42: Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in
Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such
action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore
international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade,
and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.
Art. 43: (1) All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the
maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the
Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or
agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage,
necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.
(2) Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces,
their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and
assistance to be provided.
(3) The Agreement or Agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the
initiative of the Security Council. They shall be concluded between the Security
Council and Members or between the Security Council and groups of Members and
shall be subject to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their
respective constitutional processes.
U.N. Charter, supra note 29, ch. VII.
80. Not all situations of nonrecognition of ICJ judgments give rise to threats to the peace.
While the situation in Nicaragua might, it seems unlikely, for example, that Nauru will attack
Australia if Australia should refuse to honor an award.
81. Article 57 provides, in part:
(1) The various specialized agencies, established by intergovernmental agreement
and having wide international responsibilities, as defined in their basic instruments,
in economic, social, cultural, educational, health, and related fields, shall be brought
into relationship with the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of
Article 63.
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cies provide a number of mechanisms for obtaining compliance with
judgments. For example, the Security Council could order the IMF
or the World Bank to turn over the debtor's funds to the creditor, the
International Civil Aviation Organization ("ICAO") could require
that its members deny a defaulter access to air space and landing
rights, or the World Health Organization could withhold its programs
and information from the debtor.8 2 Each of these organizations could
increase pressure on a recalcitrant judgment debtor, either individu-
ally or as part of a coordinated effort.
Some stumbling blocks might limit the effectiveness of attempts to
utilize such specialized agencies, although they do not appear insur-
mountable. For instance, the IMF's specialized agency agreement
with the United Nations is slightly different from the others.8 3 Under
its agreement, the IMF:
takes note of the obligation assumed, under paragraph 2 of
Article 48 of the United Nations Charter, by such of its
members as are also Members of the United Nations, to
carry out the decisions of the Security Council through their
action in the appropriate specialized agencies of which they
are members, and will, in the conduct of its activities, have
due regard for decisions of the Security Council under Arti-
cles 41 and 42 of the United Nations Charter."
U.N. Charter, supra note 29, art. 57(1).
82. In addition to assisting the Security Council, several of the specialized agencies require
dispute settlement before the ICI. If members disagree as to the interpretation of agency
agreements or if a member is accused of violating an agency obligation, these disputes go to the
ICY. The agency then has the power to enforce an award if a member fails to comply. For
example, the International Labor Organization ("ILO") agreement provides in article 33, "[in]
the event of any member failing to carry out within the time specified the recommendations, if
any, contained in the report of the Commission of Enquiry, or in the decision of the
International Court of Justice, as the case may be, the Governing Body may recommend to the
Conference such action as it may deem wise and expedient to secure compliance therewith."
ILO Constitution, Oct. 9, 1946, art. 33, 62 Stat. 3485, 3542, T.I.A.S. No. 1868, at 68, 15
U.N.T.S. 35, 92. See also Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Oct. 26, 1956,
art. XIX, para. B, 8 U.S.T. 1093, 1111, T.I.A.S. No. 3873, at 19, 276 U.N.T.S. 3, 36-37
(persistent violators may be suspended from the "privileges and rights of membership" by the
Governing Council). Iran has recently filed a case against the U.S. under the ICAO agreement
and could have recourse to the ICAO if it wins a judgment and the U.S. is unwilling to
comply. Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, T.I.A.S. No.
1591, 15 U.N.T.S. 295.
83. See W.M. Reisman, supra note 24, at 741-43. ICAO, for example, agrees to render
"such assistance to the Security Council as that Council may request, including assistance in
carrying out decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance or restoration of peace and
security." ICAO Agreement, supra note 82, art. 7.
84. Agreement Between the United Nations and the International Monetary Fund, April
15, 1948, art. III, para. 1, 16 U.N.T.S. 328, 332.
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The term "due regard" implies that the IMF may refuse a Security
Council order, and some commentators have stated that it would
likely refuse such an order rather than endanger its working capital
by allowing attachment for satisfaction of judgments. 85  The IMF
could not refuse to assist the Council in all cases, however;86 it could
always fashion assistance in a minimally confrontational manner.87
Thus, it appears that the Security Council could make effective use of
specialized agencies, although not perhaps in every case in which it
sought to utilize them.
The Security Council promises to be a more effective enforcer of
judgments than the ICJ itself. Certain aspects of the Council's
enforcement potential are still unexplored: the use of the veto in cases
in which the member state has an interest, the finality of awards, the
ability to command third-party states to seize assets and the extent to
which the Council can employ its statutory authority to compel
action by international organizations. Long dismissed as irrelevant,
recent events have shown that the Security Council may yet prove to
be an effective enforcer of judgments.
C. The General Assembly
Unlike the Security Council, the U.N. General Assembly has no
explicit power to enforce ICJ decisions. Under the U.N. Charter,
however, the Assembly possesses indirect authority to do so; it can
discuss and make recommendations regarding any question "relating
to the powers and functions of any organs provided for in the present
charter. ' 88  This broad authority probably includes discussing and
85. See W.M. Reisman, supra note 24, at 745-53.
86. While the IMF does have greater discretion than other agencies, it does have some
obligation to help the Security Council, and the United States, for one, took the position
during the Hostage crisis that IMF funds could be restricted for some purposes. See De
Pardieu, The Carter Freeze Order: Specific Problems Relating to the International Monetary
Fund, 9 Int'l Bus. Law. 97 (1981); Cf. the attempt by a French corporation which had won a
judgment against Yugoslavia to "garnish the proceeds of World Bank loans to Yugoslavia by
serving notice on the European Office of the World Bank." Apparently the attempt was
abandoned. Soci6t6 Europ6ene d'Etudes et d'Entreprises (SEEE) v. People's Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia, reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 71 (1975); see Delaume, SEEE v. Yugoslavia: Epitaph or
Interlude, 4 J. Int'l Arb. 25 (1987).
In any event, occasional requests for aid in enforcement are unlikely to undermine the
IMF's capital, although a threat to pull out of the organization by a major investor like the
United States or Japan might dissuade the IMF from helping, regardless of the legal
obligations.
87. For example, rather than handing over funds, the IMF could restrict use of funds or
assess interest until the debtor has paid.
88. U.N. Charter, supra note 29, art. 10.
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making recommendations when states fail to comply with ICJ judg-
ments, especially where a judgment is related to peace and security
concerns.
Under the Charter scheme the Security Council has primary
authority for peace and security, but the General Assembly, via its
Uniting for Peace Resolution, can make recommendations which
could include calling on members to use force.89 The Soviet Union
has disputed the right of the Assembly to authorize force.90 Never-
theless the Assembly's actions during the Suez crisis of 1956 and in
the Middle East in 1958 under the Resolution9' show that in the
future, the Assembly could plainly recommend economic sanctions
against the judgment debtor, deny benefits and services, order a
peacekeeping force to patrol borders or send the Secretary General to
discuss compliance; 92 nonetheless this avenue for enforcing judg-
ments remains largely unexplored.
III. ENFORCEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES
Despite the authority to enforce ICJ judgments codified in the char-
ters of international organizations, most international law is enforced
not through formal international institutions but informally by the
state members of the system.9 3 Domestic, not international, courts
are generally considered to be the primary enforcers of international
law,94 and they could potentially play an important role in ICJ
enforcement.
A. Courts of the Judgment Creditor
Although domestic courts are its primary enforcers, international
law presumably does not require the judgment creditor to resort to its
own courts before seizing any of the debtor's assets which may be
89. See G.A. Res. 377A(V), 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 20) at 10-12, U.N. Doc. A/1775
(1950); see also C. Jenks, supra note 13, at 694-95.
90. See L. Goodrich, E. Hambro & A. Simons, supra note 42, at 52.
91. See id. at 125.
92. The General Assembly met in emergency session and authorized a peacekeeping force
for Suez as a means of ending the fighting among Egyptian, French, British and Israeli troops.
See R. Bowie, Suez 73 (1974).
93. See, e.g., J. Brierly, The Law of Nations 100-02 (6th ed. 1963).
94. U.S. courts have a long history of such enforcement. See, e.g., The Paquete Habana,
175 U.S. 677 (1900); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). For an in-depth
discussion of the role of municipal courts in enforcing international law, see F.A. Mann,
Studies in International Law (1973)Cm particular, ch. X, "International Delinquencies Before
Municipal Courts"); W.M. Reisman, supra note 24, at 802-35.
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within the creditor's jurisdiction. 95 On the other hand, the creditor's
domestic law may require judicial process in order to transfer title to
property lawfully or to accomplish other types of enforcement meas-
ures. This section considers how the average domestic court is likely
to respond to the request to enforce an ICJ judgment.
No party to either a PCIJ case or an ICJ case has asked a domestic
court to enforce a judgment. Over the years, however, individuals
who stood to benefit by the enforcement of a judgment have asked
various domestic courts for enforcement and these cases raise many of
the questions which would arise regardless of who asked for judicial
intervention. One of the most prominent, Socobelge v. Greece,96
involved a beneficiary's request for assistance from the courts of the
judgment creditor.
In 1951, a Belgian company, Socobelge, sought enforcement in
Belgium of a PCIJ decision97 against Greece, which had affirmed cer-
tain arbitral awards in favor of Socobelge as valid and binding on
Greece. Greece nevertheless still refused to pay the awards, leading
Socobelge to attach monies derived from Marshall Aid funds located
in a Belgian bank and to seek enforcement of the award through the
Belgian courts.98
Greece asserted a defense of sovereign immunity against the
claim. 99 The Belgian court dismissed this claim, however, on the
ground that the assets in question "were derived from economic activ-
ities," making the defense of sovereign immunity inapplicable.c0 Yet,
95. Normally if a state takes the property of an alien without a public purpose on a
discriminatory basis and without compensation, the state has committed a wrongful act. See
Restatement, supra note 74, § 712A comment a. But when the taking involves another state's
assets following a judgment by the ICJ that the state had committed a wrongful act, the
creditor may take the debtor's property without being accused of a wrongful act:
The wrongfulness of an act of a State not in conformity with an obligation of that
state towards another State is precluded if the act constitutes a measure legitimate
under international law against that other State, in consequence of an internationally
wrongful act of that other State.
Art. 30, Draft Convention on State Responsibility in Report of the International Law Com-
mission on the Work of its Thirty-Second Session, 35 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10) at 67, U.N.
Doc. A/35/10 (1980) [hereinafter Draft Convention]; see also Restatement, supra note 74,
§ 206 comment e.
96. 1951 I.L.R. 3 (1951); see also Bishop, Judicial Decisions, 47 Am. J. Int'l L. 508 (1973).
97. Soci6t6 Commerciale de Belgique (Belg. v. Greece), 1939 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 78
(June 15).
98. See C. Jenks, supra note 13, at 708; S. Rosenne, supra note 30, at 130-33; Schachter,
supra note 25, at 12-13.
99. The theory of sovereign immunity holds that a sovereign should not be subject to the
authority of the courts of another state. Restatement, supra note 74, § 451.
100. C. Jenks, supra note 13, at 708. Professor Reisman applauded the Belgian court for not
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despite its favorable ruling on sovereign immunity, the Belgian court
ultimately did not order Greece to pay. Socobelge did not have an
exequatur, which would have given the ICJ judgment the same effect
as the judgment of a Belgian court.101 The court held that Socobelge
required an exequatur because "in the absence of an independent
power of execution belonging to [the PCLJ], which would enable liti-
gants before it to execute its decisions de plano, these decisions are not
exempt from the servitude imposed on Belgian territory on decisions
of other than Belgian tribunals."' 02 In effect, the Belgian court
treated the PCIJ judgment as the judgment of a foreign country.
Commentators have criticized this decision on the grounds that
Belgium, as a party to the ICJ decision, was required to enforce the
award through all its governmental divisions, including its courts. 0 3
Such criticism, however, is misplaced. Certainly the Greek courts
had the obligation to enforce the judgment, along with all other
organs of the Greek government.' °4 Belgian courts, however, as bene-
ficiaries of the judgment,'0 5 had no obligation or duty to enforce the
PCIJ's decision in its favor, any more than they were obligated to
accept the benefit of the judgment at all. °1
applying sovereign immunity to the case. If it had, "the long-range results would have been
disastrous for the effectiveness of the International Court of Justice. . . National courts,
potentially the most effective and economic enforcers of international judgments, would have
been unauthorized to enforce any I.CJ. judgment that dealt with an act jure imperil." W.M.
Reisman, supra note 24, at 820.
101. "ITihe rule in civil law countries is that a foreign judgment is enforced qua judgment
and is in effect transformed into a domestic judgment by the grant of an exequatur (meaning
"let it be executed"] or similar procedure giving it the same executory effect of a judgment
rendered locally." G. Delaume, Law and Practice of Transnational Contracts 211 (1988).
102. Socobelge v. Greece, 1951 I.L.L 3, 4 (1951).
103. Rosenne writes that:
The duty to carry out, or comply with, such a judgment is imposed upon the
courts of a State party to litigation before the International Court no less than it is
incumbent upon the other organs of that State, and if the municipal courts are unable
to do so, then the international responsibility of the State will be engaged. As the
Permanent Court itself said in the Chorzow Factory case (merits):-it is impossible to
attribute "to a judgment of a municipal court power indirectly to invalidate a
judgment of an international court."
S. Rosenne, supra note 30, at 132-33.
104. Cf. supra note 75 (position of U.S. courts regarding the Nicaragua case).
105. These rights belonging to the judgment creditor belong to all of its governmental
organs, including its courts.
106. Although article 59 of the Court's Statute says the judgment is binding on the parties,
the international community has not taken the view that the beneficiary of the judgment may
not reject the benefit. The U.S., for example, settled its case against Iran on terms other than
those ordered by the ICJ. Wegen, Discontinuance of International Proceedings: The Hostages
Case, 76 Am. J. Int'l L. 717 (1982). How, then, could it have such an obligation when it also
had the right to decide to forgive a judgment in its favor at any time or to negotiate an entirely
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What is most interesting about Socobelge is its treatment of ICJ
judgments for purposes of enforcement as foreign domestic judg-
ments. Such treatment may not necessarily be fatal to achieving the
goal of enforcement, as it was in Socobelge, but there are reasons for
trying to convince domestic courts to take a different view of ICJ
judgments. Because ICJ judgments are infrequent, state-specific judg-
ments, they are visible to the world community. When not enforced,
the community's perception of international law suffers. Only a few
domestic courts, at least in the near future, are likely to be called on
to enforce ICJ judgments; thus, if those courts are not persuaded that
the better approach is to enforce the judgments, damage may occur.
Clearly a major problem in Socobelge was the lack of a domestic
statute or guideline explicitly calling on the court to enforce the inter-
national judgment. Even if Belgium had no legal duty to enforce the
judgment as a party to the case, however, it could have relied on other
legal bases.'07 Under the monist theory, for example, international
law and courts are viewed as superior to domestic courts, which can-
not dismiss or invalidate, directly or indirectly, the decisions of a
higher court.10 8 Some states have specifically incorporated the monist
theory into their constitutions, providing their courts with the needed
rule of decision.I19 The adoption of a monist view of international law
different sort of settlement than the one ordered by the Court? For examples where states have
agreed inter se to modify or ignore ICJ judgments, see supra note 37.
107. Only the Security Council has specific authority to aid in enforcement. See supra text
accompanying notes 62-70. Without this specific authority most domestic courts will be
unsure of their appropriate role in ICJ enforcement. M. Reisman, supra note 24, at 672. Thus
the discussion which follows sets out the theoretical legal basis on which domestic courts may
act in enforcement. Rosenne reports that the Socobelge court said, in regard to its decision to
treat PCIJ judgments as if they were foreign domestic decisions, "if de lege ferenda it seemed
proper to conceive that such a judgment should be exempt from exequatur, it was nevertheless
clear that at present there was no international arrangement by which such exemption had
been introduced into Belgian Law." S. Rosenne, supra note 30, at 131.
108. Monists "regard international law and municipal law as parts of a single legal system.
In a prevalent version of monism, municipal law is seen as ultimately deriving its validity from
international law, which stands 'higher' in a hierarchy of legal norms." L. Henkin, R. Pugh,
0. Schachter & H. Smit, International Law: Cases and Materials 141 (2d ed. 1987) [hereinafter
L. Henkin]. "[T]he internationalists may claim that they were the first to perceive what is now
known as the monistic view of the relation between international and municipal law. This, in
itself, is a valuable contribution on account of the strong ethical appeal to legal conscience
made by a philosophy which asserts the absolute and homogeneous character of right and
wrong and which denies and combats the principle that what public international law
condemns is yet right in municipal law and that what the municipal laws of the world provide
for is yet irrelevant for the purposes of public international law." F.A. Mann, supra note 94, at
367.
109. See, e.g., Grundgesetz [GG] art. 25 (W. Germany); Kenpa art. 98 (Japan);
Costituzione [Cost.] art. 10 (Italy).
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is left up to the individual state and is not clearly compelled by inter-
national law. 110
In other systems, however, even without monist principles, ICJ
judgments should get different treatment than domestic judgments.
Treating ICI judgments as domestic foreign judgments while continu-
ing to accept other sorts of international judgments at face value, eg.,
arbitral decisions rendered between two states, such as the Iran-U.S.
Claims Tribunal, amounts to an inexplicable disparity. Similarly,
subjecting ICI judgments to the treatment due to foreign awards will
in some cases lead municipal/domestic courts to reexamine the deci-
sions."' Such reexamination, although perhaps required under a
court's domestic law, will likely conflict with the IC rule that IC
judgments are final, and will thus violate the international law rule
enunciated in the Chorzow Factory that no municipal court can render
invalid directly or indirectly the decision of an international court. 1 2
At bottom, then, Socobelge stands for the "continuing confusion"
on the part of domestic courts regarding the enforcement of ICJ judg-
ments." 3 In response to such confusion, one possible solution would
be to encourage states to implement domestic legislation directing
courts to enforce ICJ judgments on the same basis as international
arbitral awards. 14 It may be possible, however, to get the desired
result without waiting for states to adopt such legislation, if a creditor
can persuade a domestic court that ICJ judgments should be enforced
as an international arbitral award, or a least like one.
1. Arbitration Enforcement Under the New York Convention
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in Minis-
110. F.A. Mann, supra note 94, at 366. Non-monist courts may actually find it easier to
arrive at the same outcome, the enforcement of ICJ judgments. Such courts often recognize
that, although the ICI is not so obviously a superior court, it must rely on domestic courts to
get enforcement and that enforcement is so important for the international system, from which
all states benefit, that it is incumbent on state courts to make the system work. The U.S.
Supreme Court, for example, has stated unequivocally in recent cases that the proper
functioning of the international business community depends on enforcement, without
parochial interference, of international decisions. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 629 (1985).
111. See supra note 101 (requirements for an exequatur).
112. The PCIJ said in Chorzow Factory, "it is impossible to attribute to a judgment of a
municipal court power indirectly to invalidate a judgment of an international court." Case
Concerning the Factory at Chorzow (Ger. v. Pol.), 1927 P.C.IJ. (ser. A) No. 12, at - (Nov.
21), quoted in S. Rosenne, supra note 30, at 133.
113. W.M. Reisman, supra note 24, at 672.
114. Id. at 672-73.
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try of Defense of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. Gould, "'15 made con-
siderable strides toward opening up the categories of international
cases which may be enforced under current U.S. statutory law. The
Gould court held that a decision of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal in
favor of the Government of Iran against a U.S. corporation could be
enforced in the U.S. through legislation implementing the Convention
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards." 16
The court of a signatory state must enforce these awards as though
they were decisions of its own jurisdiction.1 7
The advantages to a judgment creditor in analogizing its judgment
to an arbitral award are several. Before the advent of the enforcement
treaties, arbitral awards were also treated as foreign domestic awards
and were subject to all their concomitant difficulties, such as the need
for an exequatur. Creditors can evade the Socobelge trap only with
arbitral conventions, which provide the judgment creditor with
favorable safeguards.
In some regards, the approach adopted in Gould seems easily appli-
cable to ICJ judgments. The court's assumption that states could
qualify as "legal persons" for purposes of the Convention (since the
Government of Iran was the appellee), for example, has particular
applicability to ICJ judgments. Another factor favoring the treatment
of ICJ judgments as arbitral awards under the New York Convention
arises out of a United States reservation to its acceptance of the New
York Convention, stating it will only enforce awards "made" in states
party to the Convention. In Gould, the court held that because the
Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal sits in the Netherlands, a party to the Con-
vention, the Tribunal's awards could be enforced in the United
States.1"' The ICJ also sits in the Netherlands, suggesting similar
115. 887 F.2d 1357 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1319 (1990).
116. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10,
1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 38, reprinted in 7 I.L.M. 1046 (1968)
(implemented in the United States by the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (1988))
[hereinafter New York Convention]; see generally A.J. van den Berg, The New York
Arbitration Convention of 1958 (1981).
Article I of the Convention states that:
This Convention shall apply to the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards
made in the territory of a State other than the State where the recognition and
enforcement of such awards are sought, and arising out of differences between
persons, whether physical or legal. It shall also apply to arbitral awards not
considered as domestic awards in the State where their recognition and enforcement
are sought.
New York Convention, supra, art. I.
117. See New York Convention, supra note 116, art. III.
118. Gould, 887 F.2d at 1364-66.
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treatment of ICJ awards.
The same holds true for the court's conclusion that a provision in
the Convention requiring that the arbitration in question be held pur-
suant to a written agreement had been met," 9 even though the plain-
tiff did not in fact consent to the procedure of the Tribunal. °20 The
Ninth Circuit held that the treaty setting up the Tribunal satisfied the
requirement of a written agreement,' 21 and that the plaintiff actually
ratified the written agreement by going to the Tribunal.1' " Special
agreements to go before the ICJ in particular cases would plainly
meet the written agreement requirement. Some ICI cases, like Nica-
ragua, come before the Court primarily as a result of an open-ended
consent to adjudicate disputes under the ICI's optional clause or pur-
suant to a dispute resolution agreement in a treaty;'2 these sorts of
cases seem potentially troublesome in meeting the written agreement
requirement of Gould. Such "open-ended" IC optional or treaty
clauses might be little different, however, from open-ended arbitration
clauses in contracts, frequently negotiated decades ago, which parties
to the New York Convention contemplate enforcing,1 24 and would
thus appear to be sufficient under the Gould test.
Gould does, however, leave unanswered some objections to enforce-
ment of IC judgments under the New York Convention. One poten-
tial obstacle is the "commercial case" reservation. Some states
(particularly the U.S. and France) will only enforce commercial deci-
sions under the Convention. 15  Such a reservation would likely
exclude some ICJ judgments, although not all; the recent case
between the U.S. and Italy was a commercial case,126 as were Anglo-
Iranian Oil,127 Interhandel 2 and Barcelona Traction.2 9
119. New York Convention, supra note 116, art IM
120. Rather, it tried first to sue Iran in U.S. domestic courts, but had its case dismissed
following the Supreme Court's decision in Dames & Moore v. Reagan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981). in
which the Court said claimants' recourse against Iran was at the Tribunal. Gould, 887 F.2d at
1359-60.
121. Gould, 887 F.2d at 1363-64.
122. Id. at 1364. This is surely stretching the point since the plaintiff had no other choice
but to bring his claim before the Tribunal.
123. ICJ Statute, supra note 28, art. 36(2).
124. "Open-ended" consent to ICI jurisdiction, at least on the part of the United States
may become a feature of the past. See generally supra note 8.
125. Other states possessing a commercial reservation include Canada (not Quebec) and the
Vatican; states without commercial reservations include Belgium, Denmark, Netherlands,
Federal Republic of Germany, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and U.S.S.R.
126. Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (U.S. v. Italy), 1989 I.C.J. 15 (Judgment of July 20).
127. Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. (U.K. v. Iran), 1952 I.C.J. 93 (Judgment of July 22).
128. Interhandel (Switz. v. U.S.), 1959 I.C.J. 6 (Judgment of March 21).
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Similarly, it is unclear whether the Convention, which refers specif-
ically to "awards," 130 excludes "judgments."13' The Convention itself
does not seem to contemplate the enforcement of ICJ judgments spe-
cifically; 132 traditionally recognized distinctions between arbitral
awards, handed down by tribunals organized by the parties to a par-
ticular case, and litigated courtroom judgments continue to obtain.133
Yet such rigid distinctions may no longer be appropriate, as the differ-
ences between arbitral "award" and litigated "judgment" begin to
blur. 134 Some domestic courts may consequently be persuaded by this
analogy, albeit an imprecise one, between arbitral awards and ICJ
judgments and choose to enforce ICJ judgments under the New York
Convention.
2. Arbitration Enforcement as Customary International Law
Where ICJ judgments cannot be fitted into the constraints of the
conventions directly because of the "award/judgment" dichotomy or
other reason, a creditor might nevertheless still succeed in obtaining
enforcement of an ICJ judgment, if it could show that arbitral awards
would be enforced under the same principles as outlined in the con-
ventions on arbitral enforcement, even if the conventions were for
some reason to lapse. To argue along these lines, a creditor would
need to show that the domestic law of the state in question had
evolved away from a discretionary norm in the enforcement of arbi-
tral awards to the point where such awards were to be honored as per
129. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3
(Judgment of Feb. 5).
130. See New York Convention, supra note 116, art. I.
131. For a typical division, see L. Henkin, supra note 108, ch. 8 (cf. § 3, "Arbitration" with
§ 4, "International Court of Justice"); see also Restatement, supra note 74, §§ 903 & 904. But
cf. lecture by Shabtai Rosenne, Reflections on International Arbitration and Litigation in the
International Court of Justice, published in Forum Internationale (No. 9), 3-4 (1987) ("Much
has occurred in the last twenty years or so to warrant re-examination of some central features
distinguishing the one form of judicial settlement of inter-State disputes from the other.").
132. Professor Schachter, a primary drafter of the Convention, does not even mention the
possibility in his article on ICJ enforcement, written only two years after the Convention was
adopted. See Schachter, supra note 25.
133. The Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal has been in existence for almost 10 years and may be
for a few more. It has adopted its own set of procedures and rules which it employs in regard
to all cases coming before it, and does not generally give the parties appearing before it a say in
the selection of judges. Parties to a Chamber of the ICJ may, on the other hand, select their
own judges. Both methods produce a binding decision.
134. For example, both types are rendered on the international plane and both are based
upon the consent of the parties to adjudicate. See Caron, The Nature of the Iran-United States
Claims Tribunal and the Evolving Structure of International Dispute Resolution, 84 Am. J.
Int'l L. 104, 107 (1990).
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se domestic judgments of the enforcing state. This could be achieved
either by going to a state where it had proof of such evolution in its
domestic law, or, if the creditor found sufficient evidence of a wide-
spread enforcement principle, by arguing that international law had
developed a general principle of enforcement which encompassed IC
awards directly or by analogy.1 35
Such an international enforcement principle most surely exists.
When first confronted with international arbitral awards as the world
economy began to internationalize after the Second World War,
courts tended to treat them as foreign national awards, just as the
Belgian court treated the ICJ judgment 1 36  Probably because they
were not just like foreign judgments, however, getting arbitral awards
enforced proved even more difficult and unpredictable to achieve and
thus limited the efficacy and utility of arbitration. 37
To realize better enforcement of arbitral awards, states drafted the
New York Convention, which was intended to overcome parochial
barriers to enforcement.' 38 Other conventions have followed, increas-
ing the geographic and subject matter reach of the New York Con-
135. When a court is confronted with a question of international law it may "resort to the
rules of municipal law for the disposal of cases submitted to it, or, to put it technically, Article
38 authorizes the use of analogy" to municipal law. M. Virally, The Sources of International
Law, in Manual of Public International Law 116, 147 (M. Sorensen ed. 1968). See also Bin
Cheng, The General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals
(1953); H. Lauterpacht, Private Law Sources and Analogies of International Law (1927);
Restatement, supra note 74, § 102 comment 1.
The ICJ has frequently relied on analogy to major legal systems for a source of law,
especially when questions of judicial procedure, such as an enforcement, has been at issue.
This method of finding general principles of international law has come into its own with the
work of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal. The Tribunal has relied heavily on analogy to
domestic law in resolving disputes between Iran and the U.S. and its nationals.
There is also an argument that principles found in numerous treaties can be customary
international law. See A. D'Amato, The Concept of Custom in International Law (1971). The
argument is not developed here because the problem of finding state practice outside a treaty is
difficult where most states are parties to the treaties and they are in force.
136. See Restatement, supra note 74, § 487 comment h.
137. See Note, Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards - The United Nations
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 14 Ga. J. Int'l
& Comp. L. 217, 218 (1984) (citing McMahon, Implementation of the United Nations
Convention on Foreign Arbitral Awards in the United States, 2 J. Mar. L & Com. 735, 736
(1971)).
138. See supra note 116. Most writers consider the New York Convention a great success.
See, e.g., Paulsson, Arbitration Unbound: Award Detached from the Law of its Country of
Origin, 30 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 358 (1981) ("Apart from unilateral recognition of awards or the
operation of bilateral treaties, the arbitral process enjoys transnational efficacy under the New
York Convention of 1958 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards
whose history is one of remarkable success.").
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vention. 139 All together, these conventions are strong evidence that a
preponderance of states and most of the regions of the world are com-
mitted to enforcement of international awards. The aim of such con-
ventions, to make enforcement easy and efficient, 14° has been
successful, to the point where enforcement of international arbitral
awards is more or less assumed, which has helped create the success
currently enjoyed by international arbitration.1 41
In tandem with such developments, the past several decades have
witnessed several legal systems, ones frequently involved with arbitra-
tion, modify their domestic systems so that they might better imple-
ment the wide-reaching network of treaties requiring enforcement of
international arbitral awards. Consequently, most domestic courts
now realize that the smooth functioning of international commerce
139. See, e.g., Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration,
O.A.S. Doe. No. OEA/Ser. A/20 (SEPF) (1975) (currently has 12 parties); Convention on the
Settlement by Arbitration of Civil Law Disputes Resulting from Economic, Scientific and
Technical Cooperation, May 26, 1973, 13 I.L.M. 5 (Jan. 1974) (signatories were U.S.S.R., the
People's Republic of Mongolia and six other Eastern European countries; entered into force
Aug. 13, 1973); Brussels Convention, Sept. 27, 1968, reprinted in 15 J. Eur. Comm. (No.
L299) (1972); 2 Comm. Mkt. Rpt. (CCH) No. 6003; Convention on the Settlement of
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T.
1270, T.I.A.S. No. 6090, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 (entered into force On Oct. 14, 1966; currently has
98 parties) [hereinafter ICSID Convention]; European Convention on International
Commercial Arbitration, April 24, 1964, 484 U.N.T.S. 349 (entered into force on Jan. 7, 1964;
as of June 1, 1989, it had 24 parties).
140. The drafters included several reforms over previous conventions on enforcement, of
which the following seem to account most directly for the success of the New York
Convention. It shifted the burden of proof to the party opposing enforcement and limited the
defenses which the opposing party could raise. See Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v.
Soci&t6 Gen6rale de l'Industrie du Papier, 508 F.2d 969, 973 (2d Cir. 1974); G. Delaume,
supra note 101, at 49; Note, The Validity of the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Defense in Suits
Under the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 7
Fordham Int'l L.J. 321 (1984). The Convention eliminated the requirement that the party
seeking enforcement had to seek leave for enforcement (exequatur or recognition) from the
country where the award was made before seeking leave from the courts where enforcement
was sought. W. Craig, W. Park & J. Paulsson, International Chamber of Commerce
Arbitration § 37.02, at 667 (1984). The New York Convention also permits the parties to form
the arbitral tribunal and choose the governing law regardless of the law of the place where the
arbitration occurs. A.J. van den Berg, supra note 116, at 7. It allows parties to seek
enforcement in any state signatory to the Convention, even if the arbitration took place in a
non-signing state and even if the parties are not nationals of signatory states. W. Craig, W.
Park & J. Paulsson, supra, at 660. However, two-thirds of the states signatory to the New
York Convention have made reservations to this provision and will only enforce decisions
made in states signatory to the convention. Id. at 661. In addition to these reforms, the
several states have gone even further than the conventions in limiting interference with
enforcement by their courts. Id. at 666.
141. See Note, Enforcement of International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
Arbitral Awards in the United States, 18 Ga. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 101, 105-06 (1988).
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requires ease in recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards.14 2
Domestic courts make special efforts to enforce arbitral awards regu-
larly, extending the circumstances under which arbitral awards are
enforced beyond the narrow terms of the conventions or domestic leg-
islation,14 3 and would likely continue to honor and implement them
without the conventions. 144
Recent judicial interpretations of the New York Convention have
strengthened the enforcement principle. The Convention does not
require reciprocity for enforcement, meaning the state where the
award was made need not be a party to the Convention. Although
the United States and two-thirds of the contracting states have
appended a reservation that they will only enforce awards "made" in
another contracting state,14 5 courts have limited the effect of this res-
ervation, holding that it means only that the award must be made in a
contracting state - not "in accordance with" the law of the forum
state, as was often required before the Convention.'4 Thus, the basis
for enforcement under the Convention is not its connection to a
national jurisdiction (and, in turn, to bases like reciprocity or comity)
but rather the notion that international decisions should be enforced
regardless of their connection to a state.
Some elements of discretion do remain with domestic courts in
enforcing ICJ judgments as arbitral awards. For example, although
the New York Convention does not require recognition or exequatur,
it does permit the enforcing court some limited review of the circum-
stances surrounding the award - fraud, jurisdiction and notice."4 7
Such a restriction should probably not be applied to the ICL Under
142. See supra note 140.
143. See supra note 110; but see Bank Mellat v. GAA Development and Construction Co.,
2 Lloyd's Rep. 44 (Q.B. 1988); Ebke & Parker, Foreign Country Money-Judgments and
Arbitral Awards and the Restatement, 24 Int'l Law. 21, 49 (1990).
144. U.S. courts, for example, enforce international arbitral awards pursuant to legislation
implementing the New York Convention of 1958. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (1988). They
would arguably continue to enforce arbitral awards consistent with the governing principles of
the Convention and not according to pre-1958 methods.
145. W. Craig, W. Park & J. Paulsson, supra note 140, at 661.
146. The Gould court enforced Iran's award from the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal under this
interpretation. Ministry of Defense of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. Gould, 887 F.2d 1357,
1365 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1319 (1990); see also Lewis, What Goes Around
Comes Around: Can Iran Enforce Awards of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal in the United
States? 26 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 515, 542-44 (1988); see generally Paulsson, supra note 138
(discussion of the Gotaverken Case, where Swedish courts enforced a decision made in
Switzerland but detached from the Swiss courts).
147. The New York Convention, supra note 116, art. V. The International Centre for the
Settlement of Investment Disputes enforcement convention, on the other hand, does not
permit any review. ICSID Convention, supra note 139. Its decisions, like those of the ICJ, are
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international law a municipal court does not have the power to invali-
date an international decision; reasons of fraud, lack of jurisdiction,
lack of notice, or prejudice (as determined by the municipal court)
should not constitute grounds for refusing to enforce a judgment.
Other rules of procedure such as the requirement that the judgment
be final may be appropriate if they do not invalidate the judgment.
Returning, then, to the Nicaragua case, were Nicaragua's courts to
encounter a request to enforce an ICJ judgment, their correct course
of action would be to treat the judgment as an international arbitral
award and enforce it, either because enforcement of international law
is a treaty obligation of all states, because courts now enforce most
international decisions, or because a general principle of international
law requires enforcement. A judgment creditor should be able to per-
suade its courts, therefore, to enforce an ICJ judgment.
3. Appropriate Assets
Getting enforcement of a judgment within the courts of the credi-
tor's home state will be of little use where the debtor possesses few
assets derived from "economic activities" within that jurisdiction.' 48
Governmental assets such as an embassy, or the property of a debtor's
citizens, would be inappropriate.' 4 9 Under Socobelge, however, the
scope of what may be considered "commercial" is broad enough that
even a state like the United States, which does not undertake many
commercial ventures, will likely have "real" assets in some jurisdic-
tions, such as scientific equipment (survey vessels undertaking
research with commercial applications, for example), pavilions and
exhibits at trade fairs and air shows.' 50
International grants and loans,' such as those obtained from the
World Bank, may be a vast source of attachable funds, although no
final. IC Statute, supra note 28, art. 60; but see Reisman, The Breakdown of the Control
Mechanism in ICSID Arbitration, 1989 Duke L.J. 739, 793-94 (1989).
148. The Socobelge court held that Socobelge could attach Marshall Aid funds because they
were assets derived from economic activities. See infra text accompanying notes 166-85
(discussing self-help or reprisal through seizure of assets).
149. No scholars appear to discuss the precise point raised here. A United States court did
consider the related question of whether a state could seize the assets of citizens as a reprisal
for a violation of international law, and held that a state could do so. See Sardino v. Federal
Reserve, 361 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1966). But the question has been raised whether such a seizure
would not violate an alien's human rights against discrimination or excessive penalties. See L.
Henkin, supra note 108, at 547.
150. The author is aware of an instance in which a judgment creditor attempted to attach
the British pavilion at an Italian trade fair.
151. Twenty years ago, a student writer found what he labeled "a vast source of potentially
attachable funds, loans from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
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state has yet successfully tapped them. In one case in which a private
French corporation attempted to attach a World Bank loan made to
Yugoslavia, the suit was dismissed. 52 In the future, of course, ajudg-
ment creditor may have a final judgment,1 53 and, despite the lack of
precedent, on balance it appears that judgment debtors cannot
exclude World Bank loans or IMF accounts as potential targets for
attachment in the context of enforcing ICY judgments.
B. Courts of the Judgment Debtor
Because World Bank loans and other commercial assets of the
debtor do not exist everywhere, some judgment creditors will need to
go beyond their own jurisdiction in seeking enforcement. One poten-
tial avenue of enforcement would be through the debtor's courts
because the debtor generally cannot remove all of its property from
beyond the power of its courts. Nevertheless, creditors may face
insurmountable difficulties receiving a hearing in which the debtor's
government actually agrees to payment.
The first step in securing enforcement in the debtor's courts would
be obtaining jurisdiction. In the U.S. court system, for example, a
foreign creditor would possess the same basis for standing as any
(I.B.R.D.), from which creditors may seek payment for their claims." Note, Collection of a
Foreign Debt by Attachment of an International Bank Loan, 69 Colum. L Rev 897 (1969).
152. Soci 6t Europ~ene d'Etudes et d'Entreprise (SEEE) v. People's Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 71 (1975). SEEE sent a notice of the attachment to the
Paris office of the World Bank. The World Bank prepared briefs asking the French courts to
vacate the attachment because the notice was void on technical grounds but also because it
enjoyed immunity from such attachment. Brief of the World Bank, SEEE v. Yugoslavia,
reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 354 (1985). The Bank based its immunity argument on four points, one
of which the court found to be dispositive in favor of the Bank. Yugoslavia thus succeeded in
having SEEE's exequatur annulled and the World Bank attachment was vacated.
153. The Bank's other arguments are worth reviewing. First, it argued it was immune from
suit by its members or by those suing based on claims derived from members, and that the
SEEE was in the latter category. A garnishment action, however, is not a suit against the
Bank and at least U.S. courts have concluded that garnishment actions do not violate
immunity like the Bank's. Note, supra note 151, at 902 (citing Earle v. Pennsylvania, 178 U.S.
449 (1900)).
Second, the Bank argued that the attachment was void on public policy grounds, "because
the funds sought to be attached were the proceeds of loans it had made to Yugoslavia pursuant
to agreements governed by international law." Delaume, supra note 86, at 42. If the World
Bank faces attachment in aid of an award also governed by international law, it is not clear
which public policy would be superior, but arguably it would be the need for effective methods
of peaceful settlement of disputes.
Third, the Bank argued that it had explicit immunity from attachment in aid of execution in
the United States under the International Organizations Immunities Act, 22 U.S.C. § 5288
(1988). Again, this argument was correct, but no such law existed in France, so a fortiori
without explicit immunity, the loan could arguably be attached.
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other judgment creditor seeking enforcement through United States
courts.154 The Court of Claims has jurisdiction over claims for money
damages against the United States,1 55 although an enforcement action
may be characterized somewhat differently than a claim for damages.
If so, at least the district courts would have jurisdiction based on 28
U.S.C. § 1331, which provides that "[t]he district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United States."15 6 A judgment arising out of
the United States' acceptance of the Court's compulsory jurisdiction,
the United States-Nicaragua Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and
Navigation or the ICAO Convention would seem to qualify as just
that sort of matter arising from a treaty."' Because international law
is an element of United States law,158 ICJ judgments interpreting or
ruling on international treaties or custom affecting the United States
would have the same effect on its courts as on every other organ of its
government.
United States courts, regardless of a state's ability to meet jurisdic-
tional requirements, however, often refrain from ruling in cases that
might in some way interfere with the executive branch's ability to
conduct foreign affairs. 59 Similarly, the Supreme Court has declined
to apply international law where it has felt that the constitutional
principle of separation of powers requires retreat from jurisdiction
because of the potential for executive embarrassment. 160
Given this jurisprudence, U.S. courts would find it difficult to aid a
creditor in enforcing an ICJ order if such an order required the Exec-
utive to change its foreign policy. A district court, for example, has
already refused to give effect to the Nicaragua decision on behalf of
Americans living in Nicaragua on political questions grounds. 16' The
Court of Appeals in reviewing the decision also dismissed the case,
but did so in part on the ground that the plaintiffs did not have a
cause of action to enforce the ICJ judgment. Although the court
154. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1988).
155. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (1988).
156. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988).
157. See Nicaragua, 1984 I.C.J. 392 (Judgment of Nov. 26) (Jurisdiction of the Court).
158. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
159. See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. 304 (1936). Courts have refrained
from even considering the constitutional rights of citizens, Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214 (1944), and other branches of government, Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979),
when the possible result of an adverse decision would impinge on the Executive.
160. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
161. See Committee of United States Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929
(D.C. Cir. 1988).
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seemed to grant a state's right to bring such a ease,' 62 it also ques-
tioned the status of an ICJ decision when the United States has chal-
lenged the International Court's jurisdiction to render such a
decision. 163 Thus it failed to acknowledge that ICJ decisions are final
and that the courts of the debtor have the same obligation to enforce
the decision as other organs of the debtor's government.164 In com-
mitting to the jurisdiction of the ICY for purposes of the case or under
the optional clause, a state agrees to accept the Statute of the Court;
such consent binds domestic courts not to review.' 65
C. Unilateral Self-Help
International law seems to require that the creditor attempt to
enforce its judgment through the friendliest means available, such as
judicial enforcement, before attempting self-help, but eventually the
creditor is free to try self-help. 166 Under traditional international law,
self-help was the primary means of enforcing rights: states could go
to war to promote foreign policy and war was used to enforce interna-
tional law.1 67 For enforcing the judgments of international tribunals,
states could resort to the guerre d'execution.
The most recent Restatement describes permissible self-help as con-
sisting of measures "not involving the use of force, that might other-
wise be unlawful, if such measures are (a) necessary to terminate the
violation, or to remedy the violation and (b) are not out of proportion
to the violation and the injury suffered."' 68 Nicaragua, for example,
could attempt self-help on its own or it could seek the assistance of
162. "Neither individuals nor organizations have a cause of action in an American court to
enforce ICY judgments. The ICJ is a creation of national governments, working through the
U.N.; its decisions operate between and among such governments and are not enforceable by
individuals having no relation to the claim that the ICJ has adjudicated-in this case, a claim
brought by the government of Nicaragua." Id. at 934.
163. See id. at 938.
164. See supra text accompanying note 104.
165. Some writers, particularly in the United States, have criticized the ICY for taking
jurisdiction in Nicaragua and would probably make the argument that if the ICJ takes
jurisdiction inappropriately domestic courts should not stay review. The criticisms of
Nicaragua appear to rest more on political grounds than legal ones. The case can probably be
made that the ICY has been too cautious about taking jurisdiction. If, however, the ICJ should
take jurisdiction inappropriately or commit another error which might impugn the judgment,
the proper course is to return to the ICY with these laws.
166. Restatement, supra note 74, § 905 reporters' note 4.
167. See generally L. Henkin, supra note 108, at 664-68.
168. Restatement, supra note 74, § 905; see also 0. Elagab, The Legality of Non-Forcible
Counter-Measures in International Law (1988); E. Zoller, Peacetime Unilateral Remedies
(1984); Schachter, Self-Help in International Law, 37 J. Int'l Af. 231, 237 (1984) ("The broad
conclusion is that if a state seeks judicial aid to vindicate a legal wrong, it must not
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third-party states. Generally, third-party reprisals are unlawful, 169
and third-party judicial enforcement can be a form of third-party
reprisal, 70 but international law may make an exception for third-
party judicial enforcement, especially in the case of monetary judg-
ments.1 71 In attempting unilateral self-help, the creditor decides on
the measures to be taken, although international law still lacks precise
rules regarding what those measures should be or when they may be
taken. For example, it is unclear whether the judgment creditor
should go to the Security Council in seeking enforcement. 72
The permissibility of "reprisals" in a broad sense, as a form of self-
help in the context of enforcing a judgment, is similarly uncertain.
War has been outlawed,173 so clearly states are prohibited from using
force to get compliance with an ICJ judgment.174 Beyond this delimi-
tation, however, international law has not clarified what actions
remain as appropriate responses. The guidelines governing the
"acceptable" use of force were always rather rough; 75 except in
prohibiting the most extreme responses, such guidelines regarding
reprisals not involving the use of force are rougher still. 176 The poten-
tial for exacerbating the situation through ever-escalating reprisals
predetermine the outcome by its exercise of coercive authority, except to prevent irreparable
injury when the court is unable to provide adequate production.").
169. The ICJ recently restated this rule in Nicaragua: "[i]t could only have justified
proportionate counter-measures on the part of the State which had been the victim of these
acts, namely El Salvador, Honduras or Costa Rica; it could not justify counter-measure taken
by a third State, the United States, and particularly could not justify intervention involving the
use of force." Nicaragua, 1984 I.C.J. at 127.
170. See Akehurst, supra note 22, at 1-2, 14-15.
171. Id. at 15-16.
172. Professor Schachter has concluded that it should not, perhaps because at the time of
his article, going to the Security Council was pointless. Schachter, supra note 25, at 11. Today
that may no longer be the case, see supra note 63 (describing Security Council action with
regard to Iraq).
173. U.N. Charter, supra note 29, art. 2(4).
174. But see Bowett, Reprisals Involving Recourse to Armed Force, 66 Am. J. Int'l L. 1
(1972) (suggesting that states disillusioned with the Security Council's ability to afford
protection against injurious conduct aimed at them have increasingly resorted to self-help in
the form of armed reprisals).
175. States originally developed the limitations of necessity and proportionality to apply to
the use of force. See, e.g., The Naulilaa, 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1013 (1927-8). This case is
widely cited as the locus classicus on the law of reprisal, and yet it concerned reprisal in a case
of armed conflict.
176. For example, if a state fails to pay damages of $10,000 it is probably unlawful to
respond by terminating treaties providing for vital supplies of food or medicine. But if a state
fails to pay damages of $5 billion, it is difficult to say, in the abstract, whether it is proportional
or necessary to terminate a treaty for food and medicine, or a treaty for access to ports and
canal. See J. Delbruck, Proportionality in Encyclopedia of Public International Law 396-400
(R. Bernhordt ed. 1984).
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may not, however, be as great as in other contexts, eg., where a mon-
etary judgment is involved, which provides a fixed amount as a
liMit.1 7 7
The type of self-help actions which various commentators do con-
sider lawful include suspension and termination of treaties, freezing or
confiscating assets, imposing economic sanctions,"'8 suspension of
arms sales, technology, and food shipments, limitation on economic
assistance, fishing rights, landing rights, docking rights or rights of
overflight.179  In terms of measures aimed at enforcement, the
Restatement says "[d]ifferent steps may be taken at different stages of
a dispute. For instance, limited measures are most appropriate when
a state refuses to negotiate (e.g., freezing the offending state's assets);
stronger measures become permissible when a state refuses to comply
with a judgment of an international tribunal (e.g., seizure and appro-
priation of assets)."' 80 In the most important judicial pronouncement
on the legality of peaceful, unilateral reprisals -Air Services I' - an
arbitral tribunal held that peaceful unilateral countermeasures are
lawful as long as they remain proportional to the breach.182
Attachment of the judgment debtor's property is another possible
self-help act. Under international law, only commercial assets belong-
ing to the state can be legally attached; beyond this, it is uncertain
whether a party unable to get judicial enforcement may pursue a
wider range of property, such as the property of citizens, or property
enjoying diplomatic immunity. With a few limitations, the Restate-
ment seems to concede that the judgment creditor may lawfully take a
foreign national's property as a reprisal.18 3 The taking of diplomatic
177. Questions remain regarding this form of redress. See Restatement, supra note 74,
§ 905 reporters' note 1.
178. See id. § 905 comment b.
179. See C. Jenks, supra note 13, at 691.
180. Restatement, supra note 74, § 905 comment d.
181. Case Concerning the Air Service Agreement Between the United States of America
and France, 18 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 417 (1978). France refused to allow Pan Am to change
the gauge of its planes in London for continuing flights to Paris. In response, the United States
refused to allow Air France landing rights in the United States.
182. Id. at 443-45.
Countermeasures must have some degree of equivalence with the alleged breach,' and
their aim should be 'to restore equality between the Parties and to encourage them to
continue negotiations with mutual desire to reach an acceptable solution' and to
avoid escalation that would lead to worsening of the conflict.
Restatement, supra note 74, § 905 reporters' note 5 (quoting Air Services, 18 R. Int'l Arb.
Awards at 443-45).
183. See Restatement, supra note 74, § 905 reporters' note 2. States may not, however,
discriminate against a single alien or commit human rights violations in the reprisal context,
such as ordering mass expulsions.
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or military property, however, may fall in the category of actions
which could further exacerbate the conflict, thus constituting a non-
proportional act in the enforcement context. 18 4
At the very least, alien property does not appear to deserve privi-
leged treatment, unlike military or diplomatic property. Developing
countries, for example, have often nationalized and expropriated this
property in retaliation for governmental action. The issue in such
cases is primarily whether compensation must be paid, not whether
the property is unreachable. A U.S. court has ruled that taking an
alien's property is a permissible reprisal.185 Presumably, such alien
property would include a commercial debt or arbitral award held by
aliens against the state seeking enforcement.
As evidenced by Air Services and the writings of many commenta-
tors, the concern that unilateral reprisals may escalate a dispute per-
haps renders it advisable for states to disfavor reprisals. Nevertheless,
the general lack of institutional enforcement mechanisms has
encouraged reprisals, and unless domestic courts begin to respond to
requests for judicial enforcement, judgment creditors such as Nicara-
gua may be tempted to use unilateral self-help despite the potential
risks.
IV. ENFORCEMENT THROUGH THIRD-PARTY ASSISTANCE
Another possible approach for obtaining enforcement of an ICJ
judgment would be with the aid of third-party states. While most
states, as a matter of foreign policy, may be predisposed toward giving
aid to their allies' requests for enforcement of ICJ judgments, "the
issue is... how far the third State has an obligation or right to co-
operate with the aggrieved State in seeking compliance by the recalci-
trant State." ' 6 Some commentators argue that third-party states are
184. See id. § 905 reporters' note 5. Note that the international community has a very high
expectation that states should not interfere with diplomatic and military property. Cf. United
States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3 (Judgment of May
24).
185. A U.S. court has held: "[The U.S.] Constitution protects the alien from arbitrary
action by our government but not from reasonable response to such action by his own."
Sardino v. Federal Reserve, 361 F.2d 106, 111 (2d Cir. 1966).
186. C. Jenks, supra note 13, at 704. Other writers on this subject raise similar questions
about the foundation of the right to aid enforcement. Thirty years ago Schachter wrote: "A
more interesting and controversial question arises where the judgment creditor seeks to levy on
assets which are not within its territory or jurisdiction, and consequently where the
collaboration or consent of other states is necessary to effect the attachment. The issue,
generally stated, is whether a third state not a party to the litigation has the right, without
incurring liability, to transfer assets within its jurisdiction to the state which won a judicial or
arbitral award against another state but has been unable to obtain execution of the award."
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prohibited from aiding in enforcement because such assistance would
amount to unlawful interference with the property or affairs of the
judgment debtor approaching the level of expropriation. The docu-
ments relating to the ICJ do not mention an explicit right of assist-
ance, but sufficient evidence of state practice suggests that states
clearly have a right to aid in enforcement and may even have a duty
to do so, although any assistance must be pursuant to fair procedure.
A. The Right to Assist
Generally, states are free to act unless prohibited from doing so by
the rules of international law.18 7 Third-party states seeking to assist
in the enforcement of a judgment are free to do so unless a rule exists
prohibiting assistance, such as the rules against reprisals' or non-
interference in the affairs of another state.18 9 In such cases, willing
third-party states must find applicable exceptions. Rules such as
those listed above would be only minor barriers, as they are not very
specific and would only require a modest amount of evidence to reest-
ablish a state's right to act.
The evidence will not be found, however, in either the Court's Stat-
ute or the U.N. Charter because neither mention a third-party's right
to aid in enforcement. Article 94 of the Charter mentions only the
Security Council's right to assist, which some commentators have
interpreted to mean that third-party states may not assist. Article 59
of the Statute similarly says that the Court's judgment is binding only
on the parties;190 some commentators read this article expansively in
order to conclude that states not party to a case must stay out. t9 '
Over the last thirty years, however, incidents of third-party assist-
ance in enforcement have occurred, and although state practice in this
regard is not yet overwhelming, such customary action, when taken
Schachter, supra note 24, at 8. "Suppose the defaulting state has assets in a third state not a
party to the dispute, would the successful state have been legally entitled to those assets to
satisfy thejudgment? Would the third state have been under a duty to transfer those assets? If
no duty exists, would the third state be entitled to transfer the assets by recognizing the
international award as being and governed by principles of comity applicable to foreign
judgments?" L. Henkin, supra note 108, at 559.
187. See Case of the S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.IJ. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7).
188. See supra text accompanying notes 173-77.
189. See Schachter, supra note 24, at 8.
190. "Neither the Charter nor the Statute places any specific obligation upon third parties
to comply or facilitate or secure compliance with a judgment of the Court in the absence of a
decision by the Security Council that certain measures shall be taken to give effect to the
judgment. Indeed at first glance they almost appear to deny any such obligation." C. Jenks,
supra note 13, at 703.
191. See W.M. Reisman, supra note 24, at 782; see also C. Jenks, supra note 13, at 702-3.
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with the writing of several eminent scholars and reasons of policy,
supports the finding of a right to assist. 192 The domestic enforcement
analogy equally provides support to the finding that states have a
right, or even an obligation, to assist. 19 3
The most significant judicial precedent available in support of the
third-party assistance is Monetary Gold.194 Although the ICJ did not
rule in the case, it reveals the position of three states important to the
question of third-party enforcement and in particular, that of the
United States. The case arose out of claims asserted by Italy and
Albania to monetary gold that had been seized during World War
I1.195 The matter was eventually referred to the President of the
International Court of Justice, who appointed an arbitrator; the gold
was ruled to have belonged to Albania. The Western Allies, however,
had agreed that any judgment awarding the gold to Albania would be
"enforced" and, ultimately, turned over to the United Kingdom as
partial payment of the ICJ's award to the U.K. against Albania in
Corfu Channel 196 In that event, the Allies nevertheless also pledged
that either Italy or Albania could prevent transfer of the gold to the
U.K. by initiating a case in the ICJ following the arbitral decision. 97
Britain's representative in the case asserted its right to take reason-
192. The writing of scholars is cited as a subsidiary source of international law in the
Court's Statute, ICJ Statute, supra note 28, art. 38(c), and as evidence of the law in the
Restatement, supra note 74, § 103(2)(c).
193. Among the writers, Professor Reisman also has argued that for reasons of policy
international law does not simply permit but requires third-party states to aid in enforcement.
See W.M. Reisman, supra note 24, at 781.
194. Monetary Gold Removed From Rome in 1943 (Italy v. Fr., U.K., U.S.), 1954 I.C.J.
19, 45 (Judgment of June 15); see supra note 58 and accompanying text.
195. In 1943, as German troops withdrew from Italy following the Armistice with that
country, they acquired certain monetary gold from a bank in Italy. The allies later recovered
the gold in Germany and deposited it in a pool with other monetary gold. To distribute the
gold appropriately, the United States, France and the United Kingdom created the Tripartite
Commission for the Restitution of Monetary Gold under the terms of the Paris Agreement on
Reparation of January 24, 1946. For detailed accounts of the case, see C. Jenks, supra note 13,
at 703-06; E. Nantwi, The Enforcement of International Judicial Decisions and Arbitral
Awards in Public International Law 138-40 (1966); W.M. Reisman, supra note 24, at 793-801;
S. Rosenne, supra note 30, at 142-48; Schachter, supra note 25, at 7-12.
196. The Court had ordered Albania to pay reparations for deaths and damage caused by its
mining of the Strait of Corfu and firing on British Naval vessels. By the damages phase of the
case, Albania was contesting the Court's jurisdiction, but it nevertheless entered into
negotiations with Britain regarding the Court's award. It offered £40,000 for a judgment of
£843,947. The British rejected the offer and instead tried to satisfy the judgment the monetary
gold. See S. Rosenne, supra note 30, at 143.
197. Rosenne notes:
This opportunity for judicial control, provided by the States collaborating in the
attachment process, meets the general requirements of legality and good faith which
should characterize such actions by States, and the value of this precedent, in which
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able steps to ensure the enforcement of ICJ judgments (admittedly an
act without precedence in the Court's history), but such arguments
failed. Italy instituted a case with the ICJ, but because Albania - a
necessary party - failed to appear before the Court, questions relat-
ing to Albania's behavior could not be decided and the case was
dismissed.
Despite the fact that the ICJ could not rule on the Allies' enforce-
ment program, at least one commentator has concluded that the case
suggests the following propositions regarding third-party
enforcement:
1. That states are entitled under international law (and
possibly may be considered under a duty) to assist in the
execution of a decision of the International Court, if that
decision has not been complied with and the successful
party requests such assistance;
2. That such assistance may include transferring to the
judgment creditor assets of the judgment debtor which are
located in the territory of the third state without obtaining
the consent of the debtor state and without obtaining the
sanction of the Security Council or a further decision of the
International Court;
3. That the right of the third state to effect such transfer is
subject to a duty on its party to take necessary measures to
safeguard any competing claims of other parties as, for
example, by providing for judicial control as to the respec-
tive claims of all parties.198
State practice since Monetary Gold, although limited, supports
these conclusions, which also underscore the argument that, although
general third-party reprisals or assistance to the creditor are unlawful,
international law provides an exception for assistance which incorpo-
rates judicial process. To date, no state which has received a judg-
ment from the ICJ has gone to the courts of a third state, in order to
attach the assets of the judgment debtor or to attain some other sort
of enforcement. In Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. Jaffrate (The Rose Mary),
however, a British oil company, which had recently been nationalized
by Iran, succeeded in convincing a court in Aden' 99 to enforce a pro-
the judgment creditor was associated with two other great Powers, is thus extremely
high.
Id. at 146.
198. Schachter, supra note 25, at 11-12.
199. While the forum was a British colonial court, it was in some ways akin to a third.party
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visional measure of the ICJ200 in favor of a British corporation.2 °1
State action also reflects the view that third parties have the right to
aid in enforcement by creating the means to do so in the constitutions
of international organizations.20 2 The fact that the Security Council
may order members to assist indicates a belief that third party assist-
ance, under the rule of law, complements existing institutional
processes. Similar provisions appear in the constitutions of other
international organizations which envision self-enacted enforcement
through the organization, with the aid of its members. The ILO
agreement, for example, provides:
In the event of any member failing to carry out within the
time specified the recommendations, if any, contained in the
report of the Commission of Inquiry or in the decision of the
court. See 1953 I.L.R. 316-28; 47 Am. J. Int'l L. 325-28 (1953); C. Jenks, supra note 13, at
713.
200. The U.K. had adopted the company's case and was attempting to have the dispute
adjudicated by the ICJ. Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. (U.K. v. Iran), 1951 I.C.J. 4, 89 (Interim
Protection Order of July 5). While the Court determined whether it had jurisdiction, the
United Kingdom requested the Court to order protection of Anglo-Iranian's assets. The Court
ordered that Iran and Anglo-Iranian jointly manage the concession areas pending outcome of
the case. Id.
201. Many of the writers on this subject include, in addition to The Rose Mary, examples of
other cases in which domestic courts gave some effect to decisions of the International Court of
Justice. Most of these cases are from the courts of the state which won the ICJ decision and do
not involve the judgment creditor directly. The cases generally show decisions of the ICJ
being used as evidence of international law on particular points. These decisions prove that
ICJ judgments are not alien to many domestic courts but perhaps not much more. See, e.g.,
Re Bendayan, 49 Am. J. Int'l L. 267 (1955), where the French Cour de Cassation invoked the
ICJ's judgment in Rights of Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco (Fr. v.
U.S.), 1952 I.C.J. 176 (Judgment of Aug. 29), to find that French courts in Morocco could try
U.S. citizens for exchange control violations. Norwegian courts in Rex v. Cooper, 1953 I.L.R.
166, relied on the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case to uphold convictions of individuals guilty
of violating Norway's fishing limits.
Cf. Committee of United States Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929 (D.C.
Cir. 1988), in which a U.S. court refused to give any effect to the decision in Nicaragua on
behalf of U.S. citizens living in Nicaragua because, on one hand, it found individuals have no
cause of action to enforce ICJ judgments and, on the other, because of subsequent
Congressional actions inconsistent with the decision. Id. at 935-38. The court acknowledged
that it might have to give effect to principles ofjus cogens even in the presence of contrary
statutes, but refused to find that giving effect to ICJ judgments is a principle ofjus cogens. The
court acknowledged that the prohibition on the use of force is a rule ofjus cogens which was
also the primary subject of the ICJ's decision. But because the plaintiffs only sought to have
the ICJ judgment enforced directly rather than using it as evidence of a violation of U.S. law,
the court did not rule on whether the United States had violated the prohibition on the use of
force. Id. at 938-43.
On the subject of the role of municipal courts in enforcing international law, see generally C.
Jenks, supra note 13, at 712-17; F.A. Mann, supra note 94, at 366-90; W.M. Reisman, supra
note 24, at 378.
202. See supra text accompanying notes 81-87.
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International Court of Justice, as the case may be, the Gov-
erning Body may recommend to the Conference such action
as it may deem wise and expedient to secure compliance
therewith. 20 3
If a member of the IAEA fails to obey an ICJ decision, it may be
suspended from the organization; members of ICAO may lose valua-
ble aviation rights, and so on.204
Several regional organizations also provide for enforcement if mem-
bers fail to comply with IC5 decisions. The Council of Europe may
take measures against a defaulter under the European Convention for
the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes. 0 5 The Organization of Ameri-
can States Council of Foreign Ministers can aid in enforcement for a
party to the American Treaty on Pacific Settlement.2 '
Similarly, commentators concluding that there does exist a right of
third-party enforcement seem to outnumber those that consider third-
party assistance to be unlawful interference in the affairs of other
207 203states, providing further evidence in support of such a norm.
203. ILO Constitution, supra note 82, ch. II, art. 419.
204. The case Iran has recently filed against the United States is apparently under the
ICAO and Montreal Conventions. See supra note 82. Iran could potentially, therefore, have
recourse to ICAO for enforcement.
205. European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, April 21, 1961, art.
19(b), 484 U.N.T.S. 349.
206. American Treaty on Pacific Settlement (Pact of Bogota), April 30, 1948, 30 U.N.T.S.
55. "If one of the High Contracting Parties should fail to carry out the obligations imposed
upon it by a decision of the International Court of Justice or by an arbitral award, the other
party or parties concerned shall, before resorting to the Security Council of the United
Nations, propose a Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs to agree upon
appropriate measures to ensure the fulfillment of the judicial decision or arbitral award." Id.
art. 50. The United States and Nicaragua are both party to this treaty. The United States has
appended reservations to its acceptance but they do not appear to apply to article 50.
207. The views of Professors Schachter and Rosenne have previously been explored with
regard to Monetary Gold. See supra notes 197-98 and accompanying text. Jenks finds a
"general obligation of comity to give whatever measure of co-operation in seeking compliance"
with international decisions, that this "general obligation of comity is in the nature of a public
duty" and that this "duty is among the factors from which one may deduce a right of States to
co-operate with each other in securing the execution of an international decision." C. Jenks,
supra note 13, at 705. Nantwi writes that "the conclusion must be drawn [from Monetary
Gold] that although States are under no obligation to co-operate with other States to enforce
international decisions and awards, they are, nonetheless, free so to act provided they do not
incur liability." E. Nantwi, supra note 195, at 175. Akehurst writes that aiding enforcement is
an exception to the general rule against third-party reprisals. See Akehurst, supra note 22, at
15-16.
208. The Restatement distinguishes primary evidence which includes state practice
referenced in "official documents and other indications of government action," from secondary
evidence which includes international and domestic judicial decisions and the writings of
scholars. Restatement, supra note 74, § 103 comment a.
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These views are consistent with those of scholars who believe that all
states may aid in the enforcement of international law.209
Additionally, when a third-party's court confronts the problem of
whether to enforce, it should also consider whether the New York
Convention applies, and if not, whether to enforce by analogy to
enforcement of international arbitral awards. Again, it is difficult to
see why a French court will enforce a decision from the Iran-U.S.
Claims Tribunal in favor of Iran against the government of the United
States under the New York Convention, but would not enforce a
judgment in favor of Iran against the U.S. from the ICJ. In light of
Gould, the United States would be hard-pressed to suggest that the
French would be interfering in the affairs of the United States by
enforcing such a judgment.
Beyond the right of third-party courts to assist in enforcement of
ICJ judgments may lie a duty to do so. Commentators have discussed
the existence of such a duty:
In some systems, failure to aid authoritative appliers unac-
companied by the intention of abetting noncompliance, is,
under certain circumstances, unlawful. There are few prece-
dents in international decisions that parallel these municipal
developments. The Treaty of Washington and the subse-
quent Alabama arbitration, however, are clear authority
that failure to prevent another's noncompliance with pre-
scribed international behavior is itself a wrongful act against
the party suffering from the original delict. This precedent
has apparently not been applied to third-party aid in judg-
ment or award enforcement, but in light of community poli-
cies there is no difficulty in transposing it to this area under
a "major purposes" or "effectiveness" construction.2"'
Such a view, if accepted, would result in more efficient enforcement
and is an important statement of policy which third parties should
209. Among these are Grotius: "The fact must be recognized that kings ... have the right
of demanding punishments not only on account of injuries committed against themselves or
their subjects, but also on account of injuries which do not directly affect them but excessively
violate the law of nature or of nations in regard to any persons whatsoever... Truly it is more
honorable to avenge the wrongs of others rather than one's own, in the degree that in the case
of one's own wrongs it is more to be feared that through a sense of personal suffering one may
exceed the proper limit [or succumb to prejudice]." Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, Book II,
chap. 20, cited in Akehurst, supra note 22, at 1. Cf. Third United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea, art. 218, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/22 (1982) (all states may enforce the
Convention's anti-pollution provisions against any vessel, regardless of nationality in the
state's ports).
210. W.M. Reisman, supra note 24, at 781.
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consider when faced with a request to enforce an international
judgment.
Finding an obligation under international law to aid in enforcement
would arguably require more evidence than establishing a mere right
to assist.2" Even the Security Council, originally intended to be the
agent of enforcement for the Court's decision, has discretion in
enforcing decisions; it is not obligated to attempt to do so in all cases.
Nonetheless, increasing numbers of states are enforcing international
arbitral awards and judgments with fewer exceptions,21 2 leading to the
perception that an obligation to do so does exist. By analogy, third-
party states may similarly conclude they have an obligation to
enforce.
B. The Process of Assistance
Given the principles discussed above, third-party enforcement
might be utilized in several ways to render assistance. Upon receiving
the award, the judgment creditor must first take steps to ascertain
whether the judgment debtor plans to comply with the judgment - in
other words, it must attempt to negotiate. Should negotiations fail,
judicial enforcement, including third-party judicial enforcement,
should be attempted before self-help, as parties should not escalate the
dispute where possible and the judicial process is ultimately a "friend-
lier" means of proceeding than unilateral self-help. 213
After the ICJ has issued an enforceable judgment, the judgment
creditor should not go immediately to a third-party state and request
enforcement. Rather, a reasonable period of time must pass to ascer-
tain whether the judgment debtor intends to pay the judgment. Dur-
ing this period,
211. Cf. Case of the S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.IJ. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7). Some
evidence does exist, but perhaps not enough at present to resolve the issue. For example, the
Draft Convention on State Responsibility characterizes the failure to perform an obligation to
be an "internationally wrongful act." Draft Convention, supra note 95, art. 3. In the
enforcement context, this could mean that if the judgment creditor failed to get assistance from
a third state, it could demand reparations from the third state, a serious consequence for an
obligation not overwhelmingly established.
212. Comparing the enforcement situation for international commercial awards with that
for ICY awards, courts in states which are party to the enforcement agreements agree to
enforce the awards, rather than, for example, agreeing to consider enforcing them. The New
York Convention states "[e]ach Contracting State shall recognize arbitral awards as binding
and enforce them." New York Convention, supra note 116, art. 3 (emphasis added).
213. See Arend, The Obligation to Pursue Peaceful Settlement of Disputes During
Hostilities, 24 Va. J. Int'l L. 87 (1983) (a state involved in hostilities has a continuing
obligation to seek peaceful settlement of the dispute; one method of fulfilling that obligation is
the appointment of a third-party arbitrator); supra note 21 (discussing the Air Services case).
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[t]he State under the obligation-the judgment debtor-is in
the first place entitled itself to determine the modalities of
the discharge of the judgment debt. These modalities thus
determined do not definitively bind the State in whose favor
the judgment debt operates-the judgment creditor-which
is entitled to challenge them. If the resulting dispute is not
resolved by the normal diplomatic process, then it will have
to be settled by application of the methods for the pacific
settlement of disputes.21a
As discussed above, international law has not yet established a period
of limitations after which the debtor can be said to have defaulted on
the judgment.215 If such early attempts at enforcement fail, however,
state practice suggests that such unenforced judgments may not lapse
for decades. No one has suggested, for example, that the U.K.'s judg-
ment in Corfu Channel is about to lapse, even after forty years; other
examples of judgments being satisfied only after protracted negotia-
tions also exist. 21 6
After a period of time has elapsed sufficient to indicate that the
judgment debtor will not comply with the award, a violation of inter-
national law can be said to have occurred. The preferred approach is
to settle disputes using the friendliest means possible rather than
214. S. Rosenne, supra note 30, at 128.
215. U.S. law implementing the New York Convention, for example, requires that
enforcement be attempted within three years of the award. 9 U.S.C. § 207 (1988); see also
W.M. Reisman, supra note 24, at 139-40. Professor Charney has some trouble determining
which ICJ decisions may have been repudiated because the facts show only that the decisions
have not been implemented. See J. Charney, supra note 37, at 293-97.
216. A recent attempt to reopen diplomatic relations was apparently stymied by the fact
Albania has not paid this award. J. Charney, supra note 37, at 294.
There are other cases of protracted negotiations after which the debtor finally satisfied the
judgment. In the Lena Goldfields Arbitration, the British could not get the Soviet Union to
pay the damages awarded. They engaged in long years of negotiations, but only succeeded
when the Soviets wanted an economic relations treaty with the U.K. In exchange they settled
Lena Goldfield. The original award was for £8.5 million plus 12% interest. The British settled
for £3 million in notes payable over 20 years, a good result considering the fact that the
property was actually worth £3.5 million. See Nussbaum, The Arbitration Between the Lena
Goldfields, Ltd. and the Soviet Government, 36 Cornell L.Q. 31 (1950).
Similarly, Mexico and the United States also resolved the case of El Chamizal only after
protracted negotiation. The United States repudiated an arbitral decision awarding El
Chamizal to Mexico. Mexico continued to press its claim whenever an opportunity presented
itself. When the U.S. suggested arbitrating other matters of contention between the two
countries, Mexico refused to do so referring to the award and making the argument that the
United States could not be depended upon to the carry out binding decisions. See W.M.
Reisman, supra note 24, at 792-93. Eventually, the U.S. bowed to Mexican pressure and
negotiated a mutually acceptable settlement.
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immediately resorting to unilateral self-help,2"' through any of the fol-
lowing measures: enforcing the judgment through the creditor's own
courts or the courts of the debtor; seeking the assistance of the Secur-
ity Council; seeking the assistance of an international organization
other than the Security Council; or searching for appropriate assets,
attaching them and seeking judicial enforcement through third-party
courts. 218 The creditor should not be constrained to resort to what
are likely to prove to be useless measures, but it should at least make a
serious good faith attempt to seek friendly enforcement. Exhausting
all avenues may in fact help to achieve friendly enforcement. Some
domestic courts, including United States courts, will be more willing
to take jurisdiction if the creditor can show that all other remedies
have been exhausted and that the domestic court offers the best means
of redress. The creditor might even try interim self-help measures to
induce friendly settlement, before resorting fully to self-help to satisfy
the judgment.
Like the courts of the parties, third-party courts may have to refuse
jurisdiction on grounds appropriate under their domestic law. In the
United States, for example, that might be via the political question
doctrine or the foreign sovereign immunity defenses for some assets.
If the debtor argues that the judgment is flawed in some respect,
domestic courts should not reexamine the decision. Third-party
courts, like the courts of the parties to the decision, have no right to
reexamine the case because such decisions are final. 219
Third-party judicial enforcement is most likely to work in a case
like Nicaragua. Once the ICJ has rendered an executory decision,
Nicaragua could search for commercial assets of the United States
within the jurisdiction of a country friendly to Nicaragua or inter-
ested in the advancement of international law.' Sweden, for exam-
217. 0. Elagab, supra note 168, at 165-66.
218. Professor Reisman advises a claimant to plan for enforcement before going to the
Court. W.M. Reisman, supra note 24, at 14-15. This may mean attaching assets prior to the
Court's judgment. See also Newman, Enforcement of Judgments, 17 Vand. J. Transnat'l L
77, 81-84 (1984) (claimants should consider attachments before receiving judgments). Yet
such action might be a suggestion that the respondent is not willing to obey the Court's
judgment and that the Court cannot get compliance, suggestions which might not be
welcomed by the Court. Apparently similar considerations have prevented some of the
claimants at the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal from attaching assets in advance of judgment.
219. See supra note 70 and accompanying text (discussing the finality of ICJ judgments).
220. Under the theory elaborated in this Article, a third-party court probably could not
enforce against the assets of a citizen of the state judgment debtor. See supra text
accompanying notes 183-85. Attaching such assets is justified above as a reprisal Generally,
third-party reprisals are unlawful and that rule would seem to protect the citizen even though
third-party judicial reprisals are an exception to the rule. If this analysis is wrong, it would be
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ple, probably fits both categories: a U.S. Geological Survey ship in
Swedish waters could be attached and awarded to Nicaragua in par-
tial satisfaction of the judgment.
The degree of assistance which may or must be rendered by third-
party states in enforcing decisions of the ICJ is becoming increasingly
clear. Third-party states have the option, perhaps even the obligation,
to render assistance when requested by judgment creditors. While
that assistance may have some significant limitations, such as the
proper "waiting period" to determine whether compensation is forth-
coming, third-party assistance has become a critical factor in interna-
tional enforcement.
V. CONCLUSION
Judgment creditors, such as Nicaragua, have a large number of
options to get enforcement of ICJ judgments. They may appeal to
various organs of the U.N. - the ICJ itself, the Security Council or
the General Assembly. They may also try to enforce through their
own courts or the debtor's courts. In the pro-enforcement atmos-
phere created by private international law developments, creditors
should have more success than Socobelge in persuading a municipal
court to treat an ICJ decision at least as well as an arbitral award.
Where the creditor lacks access to assets of the debtor in his own
country, he may have to resort to the debtor's court or to unilateral
reprisals. Third-party judicial enforcement may be a better way to
settle disputes peacefully than unilateral reprisal, and should be avail-
able in a world where virtually all other international awards will be
enforced. It is time for ICJ judgments to enjoy the same success and
recognition as decisions of international arbitral tribunals.
extremely easy for Nicaragua to get enforcement against U.S. citizens' property somewhere in
the world.
[Vol. 30:891
